Chapter 3. UN International Administrations, the ‘Light Footprint’
C. Afghanistan: the ‘Light Footprint’ Approach
One month after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a United States-led coalition embarked on a military intervention in Afghanistan aimed at eradicating the terrorist network Al-Qaeda, harboured by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. A month later, the Taliban were eff ectively
125 SC Res. 1410, UN Doc. S/RES/1410 (2002).
126 Th e Secretary-General requested a slight revision of UNMISET’s tasks in his April 2004 report.
See: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, UN Doc. S/2004 /333 (29 April 2004).
127 SC Res. 1599, UN Doc. S/RES/1599 (2005).
128 SC Res. 1704, UN Doc. S/RES/1704 (2006).
129 Ibid., para. 4, f.
130 Th e document is available at www.unmit.org.
removed from power. Th e question immediately arose what the role of the UN would be in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. From the start, it was clear that Afghanistan would not be a ‘full’ UN-led international administration like UNMIK or UNTAET. Although this kind of operation could have been a solu- tion,131 the focus was on the greatest possible participation of local actors and less international involvement. Th e main reason for this minimalist approach is probably that, after the fall of the Taliban regime, local power was logically assumed by various local leaders and commanders. Illegal economy and drug traffi cking also fl ourished after the fall of the Taliban. If the political process was to succeed, all local leaders had to accept the proposed political course of action, although, as we will see, relying on a national interim authority does not necessarily imply the disappearance of parallel structures. In addition, Afghanistan was a sovereign state, the territorial status of which was never questioned. East Timor on the other hand was not yet a sovereign state, whereas Kosovo’s fi nal status had yet to be determined. A limited UN assistance mission was therefore seen as far more acceptable to the local population and leaders than a full-scale UN administration. As the Secretary-General put it, the UN’s tasks was aimed to “bolster Afghan capacity [. . .], relying on as limited an international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible, [. . .], thereby leaving a light expatriate
‘footprint’ ”.132 Th is ‘light footprint’ approach was particularly favoured by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi who led the Bonn talks. Brahimi stated that the UN’s role “should be to provide the government with support and assis- tance, not to seek to govern in its place or impose upon it our own goals and aspiration”. He further stated that “the peace and reconstruction process stands a far better chance of success when it is nationally owned rather than led by external actor”.133 As we will see, this assumption was fl awed. Th e consequence of this approach was that the Bonn Agreement did not give the UN a mandate to exercise administrative authority over the territory, nor a direct responsibility for the administration of the territory.
Th e peace conference held in Bonn on 5 December 2001 under UN auspices resulted in an agreement which provided inter alia for a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of an Emergency Loya Jirga, a traditional Afghan National Assembly.134 Th e Emergency Loya Jirga was envisaged as convening in
131 See Chesterman, S., ‘Tiptoeing through Afghanistan: Th e Future of UN State-Building’, International Peace Academy – Report from the Transitional Administrations Project (September 2002), p. 3.
132 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/278, supra note 2, para. 98 d.
133 Aita, J., ‘United Nations’ Brahimi says Afghanistan will need help for years’, United States Mission to the European Union (9 September 2002).
134 Agreement on Provisional Arrangement of Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, UN Doc. S/2001/1154 (5 December 2001) [hereafter
‘Bonn Agreement’].
June 2002 for the nomination of a Transitional Authority to govern the state until democratic elections were held.135 Pending the nomination of the Tran- sitional Authority, an Interim Authority was established as “the repository of Afghan sovereignty”.136 Th e Interim Authority was entrusted “with the day-to- day conduct of the aff airs of the state”, and had “the right to issue decrees for the peace, order and good government of Afghanistan”.137 Th e Bonn Agreement also included provisions on the drafting of a new constitution, the convening of a Constitutional Loya Jirga by the end of 2003, and democratic elections, to be held in 2004.138
Th e participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan requested the UN Security Council to authorise the deployment of an ‘Assistance Force’ to support the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Although the Bonn Agreement confi rmed that the primary responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resided with the Afghans themselves, the assistance of the international community was requested to help the new Afghan authorities in the reconstruction of a national police and defence force.
Th e Bonn Agreement therefore consented to the concomitant deployment of an international security force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),139 which was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council.140 At fi rst, ISAF had a presence only in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Later, the mission gradually deployed outside Kabul.
Following the signature of the Bonn Agreement, the Security Council unanimously endorsed the Agreement141 and established the ‘United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’ (UNAMA),142 in conformity with the out- come of the Bonn Conference and according to the Secretary General’s report on the proposed structure for the UN presence in Afghanistan.143 UNAMA’s core mandate consists of the provision of assistance to the Interim Author- ity, the fulfi lment of the tasks entrusted to the UN by the Bonn Agreement, and the co-ordination of all UN humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.144 Th e mission was established with two main pillars: a ‘political aff airs pillar’ and a ‘relief, recovery and reconstruction pillar’, both under the
135 Art. I, 4, Bonn Agreement.
136 Ibid., Art. I, 3.
137 Ibid., Art. III, C, 3.
138 Ibid., Art. I, 4 and 6.
139 Ibid., Annex 1.
140 SC Res. 1386, UN Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001).
141 SC Res. 1383, UN Doc. S/RES/1383 (2001).
142 SC Res. 1401, UN Doc. S/RES/1401 (2002).
143 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/278, supra note 2.
144 Ibid., para. 97 and Art. III, C, 9, Bonn Agreement.
responsibility of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General.145 Th e tasks of the fi rst pillar were dedicated to the implementation of the political transition laid out in the Bonn Agreement, but also included the investigation of human rights violations and the combating of illicit drug traffi cking. Pillar II is mainly responsible for the co-ordination of UN assistance programmes and capacity development in the public sector. Although UNAMA established a framework for the co-ordination of humanitarian aid, there was no true structure to the international community’s involvement and donor assistance with regard to the other matters. However, we will see that many areas addressed under the international administrations in Kosovo and East Timor were equally present in the case of Afghanistan. Th e reconstruction eff orts were based on a ‘lead-nation approach’, leaving the responsibility for certain areas to a specifi c country: the United States was the lead donor nation for reconstructing the Afghan National Army, Germany for the police, the United Kingdom for counter-narcotics, Italy for justice, and Japan for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR).
With the holding of parliamentary and provincial elections, the Bonn process formally ended in September 2005. Despite the relative ‘successes’ of the political transition, as we will see, obstacles to a sustainable peace remain, since several critical aspects included in the Bonn Agreement have not been met: voter reg- istration, civil service reform, judicial reform and the holding of district council elections. In order to provide a continuing framework for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the role of the international community, a conference was held in London in January 2006 to launch the ‘Afghanistan Compact’.146 Th e docu- ment is not as such legally binding, as it has been neither signed nor endorsed by any government. Th e Afghanistan Compact identifi ed three priority areas in which progress still had a long way to go: 1/ security, governance, 2/ rule of law and human rights, and 3/ economic and social development.147 Th e Compact contains in its fi rst annex a set of benchmarks and timelines for each priority area. Th e majority of the benchmarks request results by the end of 2010. As a follow-up to the London Conference, the Government of Afghanistan engaged in the elaboration of a fi nal ‘Afghanistan National Development Strategy’.148 Each sector and sub-sector of the Afghan administration, ministries and independent agencies elaborated a strategy for the achievement of the goals and standards of
145 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/278, supra note 2, para. 99.
Each pillar is headed by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
146 Endorsed by the Security Council as a Framework Document: SC Res. 1659, UN Doc.
S/RES/1659 (15 February 2006) [hereafter ‘Afghanistan Compact’].
147 Preamble, Afghanistan Compact.
148 Th e Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy had been presented at the London Conference.
the Afghanistan Compact.149 Th e Afghanistan Compact equally created a ‘Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board’, with a mixed composition, and co-chaired by a senior Afghan Government offi cial appointed by the President and by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.150 UNAMA’s mandate was sub- sequently extended and redefi ned in function of the new agreement and contains six key elements: providing political and strategic advice for the peace process, providing good offi ces, assisting Afghanistan’s government towards implementa- tion of the Afghanistan Compact, promoting human rights, providing technical assistance, and continuing to co-ordinate all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities.151 Th e structure however, remains essentially the same.152