Chapter 12. Exit Strategies and Post-confl ict Administration
B. In Practice: Carefully Balancing Initial and Sustainable Success
The inadequacy of exit strategies is perhaps best illustrated by Kosovo, as no final status for the Province had been identified at the start of the mission.
Despite this unclear final status, the mission was to work towards the creation of functioning and democratic institutions and substantial autonomy and self- government. The transfer to local capable institutions was thus one of the major goals of the mission, but the problem was that full transfer of authority could not take place until the decision on the final status of the Province had been made, despite the already extensive transfer of legislative and executive powers to local institutions. UNMIK was also under an obligation not to prejudge the
1236 Chesterman, supra note 104, p. 223.
1237 Smith and Dee, supra note 496, p. 100.
final outcome, making it very difficult for the administration to work towards something that was not yet defined.
The Province’s uncertain final status had many consequences for policy choices which had to be made in various areas. Economic reconstruction is one example we have mentioned extensively. In addition, it has been stressed by some authors that Kosovo could not access credits from the international market because of its non-sovereign status, leading to the inability of institutions to support the expansion of private companies. The creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps, as a substitute national army and an ad hoc solution to the demilitarisation of the KLA, the applicable law discussions which partly resulted from the confirmation of Serbia’s de jure sovereignty, and the slow transfer of powers to local institutions were also clearly linked to the final status of the Province.
The uncertain final status not only impeded progress in the various areas, but also unnecessarily prolonged the interim administration. Although the holding of elections was one of the early achievements of the UNMIK administration, this was only a step in a long-term exit strategy. The holding of elections nev- ertheless permitted the mission to be scaled down, although in reality, this was only a perception of exit mainly aimed at satisfying the calls for independence by the Kosovo Albanians.1238 The adoption of the ‘Standards for Kosovo’ was a second move to delay the final exit of the UN administration. Although the implementation of these standards was seen as a necessary pre-condition to the start of the political process to determine Kosovo’s final status,1239 it was eventu- ally decided that the definitive settlement of Kosovo’s status could no longer be postponed.1240 Although the proposal drafted by Martti Ahtisaari might have been an interesting and constructive exit strategy, conditional ‘independence’
was not accepted by the actors involved in the discussions. However, many of the items contained in the settlement proposal have been retained, in particular in respect of the follow-on missions and the adopted Constitution.
East Timor is perhaps the best example to highlight to need to carefully balance initial and sustainable successes. The mission’s success in leading East Timor to independence is undeniable. The different elections organised under UNTAET and the creation of democratically elected institutions which have assumed power in the country have been achieved without too many problems.
The question is nevertheless whether East Timor can be seen as a success as regards the creation of sustainable structures beyond independence. The answer
1238 Chesterman, supra note 104, p. 229.
1239 Cf. SC, ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status’, UN Doc. S/2007/168 (26 March 2007).
1240 See Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005).
to this question needs to be more balanced. Several issues were not solved by UNTAET. Several setbacks have in addition arisen since UNTAET’s withdrawal and its subsequent replacement by the smaller follow-on missions. Reform of the civil service had not been adequately completed. The national army and police force, economic capacity and the judiciary prove the necessity of a close follow-up. The objective of transferring power to national institutions has been largely met, but local capacity was not sufficient to maintain stability upon independence.1241 This underlines the need for long-term UN engagement in these types of operations. The fact that the current UNMIT mission contains expanded peace-building mandates, as compared to the former UNOTIL and UNMISET missions, confirms this. The much smaller UNMISET and UNOTIL missions were not capable of providing sufficient support to the nascent authori- ties, although UNMISET’s mandate had been extended and expanded following a request by the Secretary-General.1242 The requirement of a close follow-up of the reconstruction process was highlighted by the creation of UNMIT, following an appeal by the national authorities. The current UNMIT mission has a more extensive mandate than the previous missions, and would have been ideal as a follow-on mission to UNTAET instead of the two previous limited missions.
The Secretary-General equally recognised the failure of previous UN missions to strengthen local capacity, especially in the security sector.1243
Iraq and Afghanistan reveal major similarities with regard to exit strategies.
Indeed, in both cases, the exit strategies, if these actually formally existed, were completely flawed and relied on the false assumption that elections and the creation of a national government would be sufficient. Besides the inadequate planning of the post-conflict phase by the intervening states, it appears that no exit strategy at all was developed by the occupying coalition in Iraq1244 or in Afghanistan.1245 In both territories, the military victory and the rapid but merely formal restoration of institutions perhaps led the international actors to believe that reconstruction would be smooth and uncomplicated. In Iraq, the withdrawal of American troops was envisaged very early but was never really finalised as a
1241 Chesterman described the exit strategy in East Timor as “far from ideal” (Chesterman, supra note 104, p. 233.
1242 Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, UN Doc. S/2004/117 (13 February 2004), para. 16.
1243 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2006/628, supra note 520, para. 33.
1244 See on this Williams, H. R., ‘The Reconstruction of Iraq amid the Realities of Failed Assump- tions: Consequences of the Actions of a Trusteeship of the Powerful’, in Fischer and Quenivet, supra note 781, p. 186.
1245 See for example the statement of the Belgian Minister of Defence Castle, S., ‘NATO urged to plan Afghanistan exit strategy as violence soars’, The Independent (27 November 2006).
See also CBC News, ‘No early exit strategy’ from Afghanistan’ (7 February 2004).
result of the escalating violence. It was only after the Baker – Hamilton report that the United States seriously started to envisage an exit strategy.1246 Both cases highlight that a purely political process, aimed at organising elections and creating national institutions while not providing sufficient support for these intuitions, cannot be sufficient to reduce international presence. Although the US representative to the Security Council clearly indicated that exit deadlines are not similar to exit strategies,1247 in both cases clear deadlines for withdrawal were indicated from the start.
The adoption of the compacts with Iraq and Afghanistan nevertheless pro- vided some form of exit strategy, although they were formulated at a very late stage. In addition, both compacts are confirmations of certain failures in the reconstruction processes in many areas, or at least a failure in exit strategy. The Iraqi compact is explicitly intended “to complete the reconstruction of Iraq and to set it firmly on the path to self-sufficiency and prosperity in a society with a pluralistic political, democratic and federal system”, whereas the compact with Afghanistan acknowledges that “Afghanistan’s transition to peace and stability is not yet assured, and that strong international engagement will continue to be required to address remaining challenges”.1248 Both instruments can therefore be seen as useful tools in providing sufficient international support for enhancing local capacity.
In contrast with the findings we made above, the exit strategies in both cases relied on the assumption that transferring power to national institutions would be sufficient to scale down international assistance. The question of the capacity of the institutions to govern the countries effectively had not been posed. Both compacts nevertheless set clear benchmarks, linked with deadlines. The question remains, however, whether these compacts will provide sufficient support for the creation of functioning institutions. The compacts are not treaties and thus not legally binding, and it is thus unclear how they need to be interpreted. The question has also been raised whether turning these cases into successes would necessitate both a multilateral approach and a radical policy shift.1249 The minimal involvement of the UN and other international actors in these cases has not brought the necessary results and it is therefore questionable whether the adop- tion of the compacts, relying again on national actors only, will be sufficient.
1246 Iraq Study Group, ‘The Iraq Study Group Report’ (2006).
1247 Statement by Mr Holbrooke, Representative of the Unites States, SC Meeting Record, ‘No exit without strategy’, UN Doc. S/PV.4223 (15 November 2000), p. 5.
1248 See the preamble of both Compacts.
1249 See on Iraq: International Crisis Group, ‘After Baker-Hamilton: What to do in Iraq’, Middle East Report No. 60 (19 December 2006). The recommendation contained in the ICG report reflects in our view an effective assessment of the situation and could equally be envisaged in the case of Afghanistan, although admittedly, the situation presents many differences.