PART III POSTCONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN PRACTICE
C. Security Sector Reform: Building National Law Enforcement and
2. Ensuring Sustainability in East Timor
Before UNTAET’s arrival in East Timor, the Australian-led INTERFET force had been authorised under Security Council Resolution 1264 to restore peace and security following the outbreak of violence after the popular consultation.691 We argued in our second part that INTERFET was legally bound by the laws of occupation as the only applicable legal framework for its operations. In line with that analysis, and considering that no civilian authority existed to deal
686 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, ‘Parallel Structures’
in Kosovo (October 2003), p. 14.
687 For a recent overview see OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights, Decen- tralization and Communities, ‘Parallel Structures in Kosovo 2006–2007’ (4 April 2007).
688 See International Crisis Group, ‘An Army for Kosovo?’, Europe Report N° 174 (28 July 2006), p. 3.
689 Cf. paras. 118 et s., Brahimi Report, supra note 175.
690 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 17, para. 5.8: “In post-conflict situations, revenge killings and even ‘reverse ethnic cleansing’ frequently occur as groups who were victimized attack groups associated with their former oppressors. It is essential that post-intervention operations plan for this contingency before entry and provide effective security for all populations, regardless of origin, once entry occurs. There can be no such thing as ‘guilty minorities’ in the post-intervention phase. Everyone is entitled to basic protection for their lives and property.”
691 SC Res. 1264, UN Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999), para. 3.
with detainees, INTERFET created an emergency system to provide detainees with a temporary review process. A Detainee Management Unit (DMU) was created in October 1999. The INTERFET Detainee Ordinance indicated that it would apply Indonesian law and international humanitarian law, although Australia denied the de jure application of the Geneva Conventions.692 By Janu- ary 2000, at the handover of its detention-related functions to CIVPOL, the Detainee Management Unit had reviewed 60 detention cases. This emergency military regime permitted the swift restoration of peace and security, under a clear legal framework, emphasising in our view the necessity to apply interna- tional humanitarian law in the emergency phase. This approach should indeed prevail in the immediate post-conflict situation, as upon UNTAET’s deployment security and law and order had already been normalised.693 UNTAET’s military component was integrated within the UN structure, and therefore fell within the Special Representative’s responsibility. The transfer from INTERFET to the UNTAET military force was uncomplicated,694 as six of the seven battalions were simply transferred to the new military force. The transfer was finalised in February 2000.695
Consistently with Security Council Resolution 1272, UNTAET deployed a UN civilian police force in order to re-establish law and order in East Timor.
By January 2000, CIVPOL was present in all 13 districts,696 although the force was composed of only 400 officers. In the same month, CIVPOL took over responsibility for arrest and detention from the INTERFET force.697 Neverthe- less, the overall reaction to CIVPOL’s deployment has been rather negative. First of all, CIVPOL’s transition from UNAMET – the UN mission deployed prior to UNTAET inter alia to oversee the popular consultation – to UNTAET was difficult, as the existing UNAMET police force had been criticised for its poor performance.698 In addition, disagreement on whether the officers should be armed, inadequate resources, and unqualified staff contributed to the slow deploy- ment of the civilian police force.699 UNTAET’s military component therefore continued to handle policing activities until the full deployment of CIVPOL.
Gradually, local police capacity was being bolstered though UN police officers who were in charge of both maintaining law and order and the training of the East Timor Police Force. This had not been planned by the UN Department
692 For an extensive overview of the functioning of the DMU see Kelly, supra note 362.
693 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/53, supra note 491, para. 14.
694 Despite some logistical problems: Smith and Dee, supra note 496, p. 67.
695 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/738, supra note 493, para. 51.
696 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/53, supra note 491, para. 50.
697 Ibid., para. 45.
698 Smith and Dee, supra note 496, pp. 74–75.
699 Ibid. and Dahrendorf et al., supra note 496, paras. 74–75.
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and it took some time for UNTAET to select trainers from within CIVPOL. Although the first cadets from the East Timor Police Service graduated in July 2000,700 there was at that time no overall framework for the creation of a national police force. The legal framework for the East Timor Police Force, as well as for the Police Academy, was adopted only in August 2001.701 The expected total strength of approximately 3,000 police officers was reached only in September 2003, more than a year after Timor- Leste’s independence.702 The Timorese Government therefore had to rely on the successor missions to enhance the capacity of the national police force. Under UNOTIL’s mandate, 71 complementary training courses were conducted for the Timorese national police, training in total 2,556 Timorese police officers.703 In addition, the current mission, UNMIT, deployed 1,070 international police officers in December 2006 to help restore and maintain law and order.704
The creation of the East Timor Defence Force was part of UNTAET’s DDR programme, aimed at employing former FALINTIL members, the military wing of the political party FRETILIN. Although the Secretary-General had proposed the creation of a DDR programme in October 1999, its initiation had to wait for the creation of the East Timor Defence Force in January 2001.705 The training of the East Timor Defence Force effectively started only in May 2001,706 while East Timor’s independence was scheduled just a year later. The main cause of this delay was the East Timorese leadership’s view that the country would not need a defence force.707 In addition, UNTAET’s mandate did not explicitly include the creation of a national defence force, while many had expected the voluntary demobilisation of the FALINTIL.708 The FALINTIL was finally disbanded in February 2001 with the creation of the East Timor Defence Force. The major-
700 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/738, supra note 493, para. 45.
701 UNTAET Regulation 2001/22 on the establishment of the East Timor police service, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/22 (10 August 2001).
702 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, UN Doc. S/2003/944 (6 October 2003).
703 End of mandate report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, UN Doc. S/2006/251 (20 April 2006), para. 22.
704 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007), UN Doc. S/2007/50 (1 February 2007), para. 29.
705 See Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1999/1024, supra note 310 and UNTAET Regulation 2001/1 on the establishment of a defence force for East Timor, UN Doc. (31 January 2001).
706 Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UN Doc. S/2001/436 (2 May 2001), para. 32.
707 Dahrendorf et al., supra note 496, paras. 58–59.
708 Smith and Dee, supra note 496, p. 80.
ity of former FALINTIL members were integrated into the emerging Defence Force, whereas the remaining ex-combatants were helped through the ‘Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Programme’, led by the International Organisation for Migration.709 The lack of capacity-building within the force can easily be illus- trated by the severe security crisis in February 2006, when approximately 400 members of the armed forces demonstrated in front of the President’s office, demanding a response to a petition submitted to him on alleged discrimination in promotions. The failure to respond adequately to the upheaval resulted in a decision by General Ruak to dismiss 591 soldiers, almost 40 per cent of the Force. President Gusmão acknowledged that the measure had “failed to address the root causes of the problems within the F-FDTL”. He additionally requested the Secretary-General to authorise the deployment of civilian advisers to assist with capacity-building in the field of police and defence,710 which was thus included in the follow-up mission’s mandate.711
In addition to the upheaval in February–March 2006, the overall security situation in East Timor remains extremely precarious.712 Nevertheless, when assess- ing the efficiency of maintaining law and order, in particular in the emergency phase, the rapid deployment of INTERFET and its capacity swiftly to restore a secure environment clearly were a success.713 UNTAET’s achievements with the creation of a national police force are however mixed. The Timorese police force is still embryonic, and lacks sufficient managerial experience, as well as adequate resources.714 Despite the problems with regard to CIVPOL deployment, which are in fact similar to those faced by UNMIK, and the need to be addressed at the UN level, in our view the main shortcoming was the delay in boosting local capacity. The same mixed assessment is true with regard to the Defence Forces.
The Secretary-General equally acknowledged such a failure: “[t]he absence of comprehensive regulatory frameworks has been particularly marked and det- rimental in the security sector, where an overarching national defence policy, legislation, institutional mission statements and development plans, as well as mechanisms and procedures for coordination between the security forces, have all been absent”.715 The assessment can in our view only lead to the conclusion that
709 International Organisation for Migration, ‘Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Programme. Final Evaluation Report’ ( June 2002), p. 10.
710 End of mandate report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2006/251, supra note 703, paras.
3–4.
711 SC Res. 1704, UN Doc. S/RES/1704 (2006), para. 4, f ).
712 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2007/50, supra note 704, para. 30.
713 Dahrendorf et al., supra note 496, para. 43.
714 End of mandate report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2006/251, supra note 703, para. 27.
715 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2006/628, supra note 520, para. 33.
UNTAET withdrew too early. Despite continuing assistance from UNTAET’s successor missions, the mandates of these follow-up missions are very limited and cannot on their own reinvigorate the security sector.