PART III POSTCONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN PRACTICE
C. Security Sector Reform: Building National Law Enforcement and
3. Afghanistan: the Crucial Role of a Security Strategy
The security situation in Afghanistan is characterised by the state’s official institu- tions’ inability effectively to preserve their monopoly on the use of force. Since the 1980s, the State had had no functioning national police force, while local commanders were in charge of providing security.716 The security situation in Afghanistan was catastrophic, with no structure whatsoever. The Bonn Agree- ment had asked for the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities to establish and train new Afghan security and defence forces. Following the ‘light footprint’ and ‘lead nation’ approaches, it was first recognised that the responsibility for security and law enforcement resided with the Afghans themselves, while international assistance in the security sector was delegated to lead nations. The establishment of a national army was led by the United States, police reform by Germany and the ‘disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration’ programme by Japan. In addition to providing training to national police and defence forces, one of the major challenges was the restruc- turing of the Defence and Interior Ministries.
First, it should be noted that the international intervention in the country and the subsequent adoption of the Bonn Agreement resulted in a dual role for the foreign military presence. While the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) was mainly charged with the maintenance of security throughout the territory, the US-led military presence, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, con- tinued to combat the remaining Taliban forces as self-defence in response to the 11 September attacks. The institutional framework for the international military presence and its mandate was set out in Annex I to the Bonn Agreement. That recognised “that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves”, but an international presence was deemed necessary “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security”. Resolution 1683 at first limited the presence of the international forces to Kabul and its surroundings. The geographical limitation of ISAF’s mandate was to ensure first a secure environment for the UN and the Interim Authority. However as early as 2002 requests were made to extend the military presence to other parts of Afghanistan, as was made possible under the Bonn Agreement.717 The need to extend ISAF’s mandate was reiterated by
716 Jones, S. G., Wilson, J. M., Rathmell, A. and Riley, K. J., Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005), p. 66.
717 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/278, supra note 2, para. 57.
the Secretary-General in July 2003.718 Eventually, on 13 October 2003, the Security Council decided to expand ISAF’s presence to outside Kabul,719 but this was only achieved by the end of 2006.720 In December 2002, the United States-led Coalition Forces and ISAF nevertheless also deployed a limited number of troops outside Kabul – the ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’. These troops were charged with assisting reconstruction efforts, while maintaining security throughout the country.721 The Teams equally provided a provincial platform for the training programme initiated by the United States.722
The expansion of ISAF throughout the territory was only completed more than four years after the Bonn Agreement. The limited deployment of international forces in the country from the start is one of the failures of the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan. The possible threat to the peace process by not guaranteeing a security presence throughout the country had already been indicated by the Secretary-General in his March 2002 report on the situation in Afghanistan.723 Drawing from the lessons of earlier peacekeeping operations, the international community should have been aware of the fact that effective control over the territory by a post-conflict administration is one of the preconditions for the success of the overall reconstruction process. Not only has the persisting control of local commanders hampered the official institutions in implementing reform in other areas; the international security force and the embryonic Afghan National Army have not been able to fill the security vacuum.724
The UN was not involved in the area of policing, although the Secretary- General decided to allocate one CIVPOL advisor to the UN mission. A special
‘Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan’, managed by UNDP, was created to oversee and manage the physical reconstruction of police facilities and assure the payment of salaries.725 A programme for the training of police officers was rapidly set up by Germany through the rehabilitation of the National Police
718 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/850–S/2003/754, supra note 530, para.
37.
719 SC Res. 1510 UN Doc. S/RES/1510 (2003).
720 Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security, UN Doc. A/61/799–S/2007/152 (15 March 2007), para. 33.
721 Although their mandates have been interpreted differently. See Costy, A., ‘The Dilemma of Humanitarianism in the Post-Taliban Transition’, in Donini, Niland and Wermester, supra note 615, p. 57.
722 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/58/616, supra note 531, para. 34.
723 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/278, supra note 2, para. 57.
724 Cf. United States Institute of Peace, ‘Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Recon- struction, and Ethnic Harmony’, USIP Special Report 105 (April 2003).
725 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/1173, supra note 611, para. 16.
Academy.726 In October 2002, 80 trainers had already been trained; they in turn began the training of 1,549 police officers.727 Nevertheless, as was the case with the creation of the Afghan National Army we will discuss below, the training programmes had not been supported by a wider institutional framework. The Presidential Decree on the establishment of a national police force in conjunc- tion with a complete reform of the Ministry of Interior was signed only in April 2003. In spite of the necessary reforms, the training of police officers progressed slowly as it was Kabul-centred. The German Police Programme subsequently expanded its training sessions outside the capital, in cooperation with the Pro- vincial Reconstruction Teams.728 To date, there is still an insufficient number of police officers to maintain law and order, and the latest report of the United States Government Accountability Office considers that none of the Afghan police units is “fully capable”.729 In spite of the creation of a National Auxiliary Police and a National Civil Order Police, and short-term stop-gap measures to enhance police presence in the provinces, progress in the creation of an effective police force has been very poor.
The training and reform of the Afghan National Army began soon after the arrival of the international presence,730 but obviously lacked an overall strategic framework. Next to parallel training initiatives undertaken by the United States, France and ISAF, no clear guidelines for recruitment were established, and the trained forces were often left with no instructions. The Defence Commission, established in order to propose a comprehensive framework for the rehabilita- tion and restructuring of the Afghan National Army, began its work only just before October 2002.731 In December 2002 the President eventually signed a decree providing a legal basis for the reform of the Afghan National Army and of the Ministry of Defence.732 The Defence Commission started implementing the Presidential Decree in January 2003. A first step towards the reform of the Ministry of Defence was taken in February of the same year, with a plan to provide a more ethnically-balanced ministry by the creation of several new
726 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/278, supra note 2, para. 71.
727 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/1173, supra note 611, para. 14.
728 Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter- national peace and security, UN Doc. A/58/742–S/2004/230 (19 March 2004), para. 25.
729 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability’, Report Nr. GAO-08-883T (18 June 2008), p. 1.
730 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/278, supra note 2, para. 62.
731 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/1173, supra note 611, para. 12.
732 Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan, Presidential Decree 174 (14 December 2002).
positions.733 Implementation of the plan nevertheless started only in September 2003 and was “less sweeping than had been hoped”.734 In the meantime, various training programmes had been initiated. By July 2002 the United States had engaged in an 18-month training programme for an estimated 11,500 troops of the Afghan Army, while a parallel training programme was initiated by France, and the first battalion of the National Guard had been trained by ISAF.735
With regard to the existing armed groups, the Bonn Agreement provided that after the official transfer of power to the Interim Authority “all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces”.736 The risk of not entering into a parallel DDR programme when establishing national police and defence forces was immediately raised by the Secretary-General.737 The DDR programme – the ‘Afghan New Beginnings Programme’ – was launched by UNAMA and the Afghan Administration only after the Tokyo Conference in January 2002. The programme was aimed at disarming 40,000 soldiers and reintegrating 35,000 former soldiers and combatants in the first year.738 Japan was appointed as the lead nation for the implementation of the programme,739 which programme was delayed until the necessary reforms in the Ministry of Defence had been undertaken, following the signature of two Presidential Decrees on the new Afghan Army and the reform of the Ministry of Defence in December 2002. The Ministry had indeed been charged with the collection of weapons, but former combatants and militias were reluctant to disarm, as they saw the current Ministry as representing factional instead of national interests.740 Prog- ress remained very slow, as the long-awaited reforms did not have the expected outcome, and could therefore not restore the population’s confidence.741 Despite
733 Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter- national peace and security, UN Doc. A/57/762–S/2003/333 (18 March 2003), para. 27–!.
734 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/58/616, supra note 531, para. 20. See also International Crisis Group, ‘Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan’, ICG Asia Report No. 65 (30 September 2003), p. 6. The majority of the officials had remained in place or had simply been reassigned other posts within the Ministry.
735 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/56/1000–S/2002/737, supra note 523, para. 22.
736 Section V, 1), Bonn Agreement.
737 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/487–S/2002/278, supra note 2, para. 63.
738 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/58/616, supra note 531, para. 22.
739 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/762–S/2003/333, supra note 733, para. 30.
740 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/57/850–S/2003/754, supra note 530, para. 26.
741 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/58/616, supra note 531, para. 20.
criticism, the reforms were deemed sufficient to start the pilot phase of the DDR programme in October 2003, which was expanded throughout other provinces in November and December of the same year.742 The first phase of the programme was a failure. A very limited number of ex-combatants had effectively disarmed, while those who had opted for the reintegration packages were often subjected to extortion by local commanders, who in addition lacked the political will to encourage participation in the programme.743 Disarmament and demobilisation were declared completed in October 2004 and April 2005 respectively, although illegal armed groups have still not been effectively disbanded.744 The complete DDR programme eventually terminated in June 2006, when the last ex-com- batant completed his reintegration.745 In total, over 63,000 former combatants were disarmed, 62,000 were demobilised and almost 56,000 were reintegrated, while approximately 9,000 heavy weapons were collected.746
The failure rapidly to engage in a nation-wide demobilisation and reintegra- tion programme from the start resulted in the persistence of parallel armed groups, especially in the provinces. The implementation of DDR programme could however have been feasible only if an effective National Army had been deployed throughout the country. Despite the relative success of certain parts of the DDR programme, many militias have still not been disarmed or dismantled.747 In addition, the geographically limited presence of international troops, despite the many Provincial Reconstruction Teams who maintained a limited security presence, could not close the security gap, filled by local commanders. A recent report from the United States Government Accountability Office considers that, despite massive financial support by the United States, only 2 out of the 105 Army units are fully capable of performing their mission.748 As a consequence,
742 Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter- national peace and security, UN Doc. S/2003/1212 (30 December 2003), paras. 14–15.
743 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/58/742–S/2004/230, supra note 728, para. 24.
744 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/61/799–S/2007/152, supra note 720, para. 23.
745 UNDP Press Release, ‘DDR: Reintegration has been completed in time and within costs’
(1 July 2006).
746 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/61/326–S/2006/727, supra note 534, para.
25.
747 See for an overview International Crisis Group, ‘Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track’, Asia Briefing No. 35 (23 February 2005).
748 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces’, Report Nr. GAO-08-661 (18 June 2008), p. 3.
the fiscal sustainability and effectiveness of the Afghan Army when the interna- tional presence withdraws is doubtful.749
The Afghanistan Compact reiterated the absolute necessity to engage in pro- found police and defence reforms. Although deadlines set before the Compact requested the completion of National Army reforms by 2005, the Compact postponed the time limit to the end of 2010, while agreeing on a continued ISAF presence, and its Provincial Reconstruction Teams, until the end of 2010, to “promote security and stability in all regions of Afghanistan, including by strengthening Afghan capabilities”.750 The same deadline was set for the creation of a “fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable”.751 Although training programmes had been initiated early, and progressed significantly throughout the country, the number of trained forces was not sufficient to enable the central government to address the deteriorating security situation. The lack of an effective strategy towards law enforcement752 has clearly been detrimental to the reform of the security sector, and the overall security situation.