PART III POSTCONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN PRACTICE
2. East Timor: Th e Importance of a Long-term Engagement
Beyond emergency measures, the restoration of governance and administration through the reconstruction of essential infrastructure, the provision of basic social services, the recruitment of civil servants and the reinstatement of a law enforcement system were considered immediate priorities for UNTAET.491 The emergency measures taken by UNTAET were mainly aimed at the rehabilita- tion of essential public services. These immediate responses were however only partial with regard to severe logistical problems and did not ameliorate the catastrophic infrastructural condition of the territory. Water and electricity were rapidly although very partially restored.492 UNTAET equally managed to restore the majority of the schools by April 2000.493 Other emergency measures were aimed at a swift restoration of port and airport activity, as well as health services.494 The reconstruction of the physical infrastructure however posed major problems, considering the overall destruction of public facilities in the territory. Road infra- structure, and in general the rehabilitation of the other existing infrastructures,
488 Cf. the Secretary General’s reports on UNMIK.
489 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission on Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2006/906 (20 November 2006), para. 13
490 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission on Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2007/134 (9 March 2007), para. 62.
491 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UN Doc. S/2000/53 (26 January 2000), paras. 40–62.
492 Ibid., para. 48.
493 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UN Doc. S/2000/738 (26 July 2000), para. 36.
494 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/53, supra note 491, paras. 57–61.
such as the port and airport, necessitated longer-term cost-intensive investments.495 The restoration of the telecommunications network covering the entire territory could not, for instance, be achieved before UNTAET’s withdrawal.
The problems witnessed in Kosovo relating to the planning of the mission resurfaced in East Timor. Not only was UNTAET not able rapidly to deploy to its maximum capacity, its own staff needed to be trained in governmental func- tions, as staff recruited early in the mission were apparently considered poorly qualified for certain specific tasks.496 A few months after UNTAET’s arrival, some 391 officials still needed to be recruited, especially in the fields of public services.497 Full deployment of the mission took more than a year.498
Soon after the arrival of Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello in East Timor, contacts with local personalities were established in order to involve the Timorese in the reconstruction process. The Transitional Administrator rapidly established a ‘National Consultative Council’ (NCC),499 consisting of a majority of local officials, to oversee the decision-making process during the transitional period. UNTAET immediately created district administrations, staffed by UNTAET officials, in conjunction with district advisory councils composed of Timorese nationals.500 In July 2000, UNTAET’s first Pillar (‘Governance and Public Administration’) was replaced by the ‘East Timor Transitional Administra- tion’ (ETTA), headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The East Timor Transitional Administration comprised nine portfolios, four of which were directed by UNTAET officials, the remaining five being entrusted to the East Timorese. The East Timorese portfolios included ‘Internal Administration’,
‘Social Affairs’ and ‘Infrastructure’.501 In October 2000 a ‘National Council’ was established as an early form of national legislative assembly to replace the former National Consultative Council.
The transfer of administrative functions to an East Timorese administration necessitated a reliable civil service infrastructure, which appeared to be one of the
495 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/738, supra note 493, paras. 29–30.
496 Smith, M. G. and Dee, M., Peacekeeping in East Timor. The Path to Independence (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 64. Major General M. G. Smith was Deputy Force Com- mander for UNTAET. See also Dahrendorf, N. et al., ‘A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change: East Timor’ (Conflict Security & Development Group, King’s College London, 10 March 2003), para. 176.
497 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/53, supra note 491, para. 67.
498 Dahrendorf et al., supra note 496, para. 176.
499 UNTAET Regulation 1999/2 on the establishment of a National Consultative Council, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/2 (2 December 1999).
500 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/53, supra note 491, para. 41.
501 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/738, supra note 493, para. 3. See also Smith and Dee, supra note 496, p. 65.
major difficulties.502 Local capacity was far from sufficient, and had been identified as one of the top priorities by the ‘Joint Assessment Mission’, conducted under the auspices of the World Bank.503 In trying to rely on local capacity from the start while boosting an exclusively Timorese civil service, UNTAET soon decided to set up an independent Civil Service Commission.504 The Commission was in charge of the development and recruitment of a new, and much leaner,505 civil service. The Civil Service Commission has however been criticized for several reasons: its mixed composition, the application of formal criteria not adapted to the local traditions, and its inadequate legal and institutional framework.506 In addition, the complexity of fund channelling and strict UN procedures resulted in problems in the payment of salaries in the civil administration.507 Soon it became apparent that the training of civil servants necessitated a distinct pro- gramme, especially in respect of managerial and technical positions. The ‘Civil Service Academy of the East Timor Public Administration’ was inaugurated in May 2000, to conduct seminars and workshops in management and governance.508 By July 2002, the administration employed some 5,275 civil servants.509 In the last months of UNTAET’s presence, but without its involvement, the drafting of a ‘Civil Service Act’ started under the guidance of the United Nations Devel- opment Programme (UNDP). After many amendments to the draft,510 the Act was finally adopted by the National Parliament in April 2004.511
502 Ibid., p. 63.
503 World Bank, ‘Report of the joint assessment mission to East Timor’ (8 December 1999), para. 16.
504 UNTAET Regulation 2000/3 on the establishment of a Public Service Commission, UN Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/3 (20 January 2000).
505 The former Indonesian Administration was oversized given the small territory of East Timor, 3.4% of the population compared to an Asian average of 2.6% (World Bank, ‘Report of the joint assessment mission to East Timor’ (8 December 1999), para. 16). It was obvious from the start that UNTAET could not re-employ the same number of civil servants recruited under Indonesian occupation, as this would have been unsustainable both for UNTAET and the future Timorese Government. Cf. Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/53, supra note 491, para. 42.
506 Zaum, supra note 75, p. 209.
507 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/738, supra note 493, para. 35.
508 Ibid., para. 19.
509 Ibid.
510 For an overview see Zaum, supra note 75, p. 211.
511 Democratic Republic of East Timor, National Parliament, Law No. 8/2004 Approving the Statute of the Civil Service (16 June 2004), an unofficial English translation is available at www.easttimorlawjournal.com.
With regard to property rights, UNTAET faced severe problems, as no registra- tion mechanism existed at its arrival.512 The idea of a Property Claims Commission had already been envisaged before January 2000.513 Within UNTAET, a ‘Land and Property Unit’ was established to allocate property rights on a temporary basis. The Land and Property Unit suggested the creation of a Claims Commis- sion, the ‘Land and Property Commission’ both to maintain the land registry and to resolve land disputes. The idea was rejected by the National Council, as it viewed it as contrary to traditional land ownership.514 The reluctance to address the issue was even more problematic as traditional dispute settlement was not able efficiently to absorb the settlement of claims.515
While the integration of national capacity in and the creation of administra- tive structures have perhaps been a success for UNTAET, building an efficient public service was one of the most difficult aspects of UNTAET’s mandate.516 The overall assessment of UNTAET’s performance in the public administration sector has been described as mixed,517 although the difficulty of UNTAET’s task, considering the above-described setbacks, needs to be emphasised. The Joint Assessment Mission indeed found that “[t]he window of opportunity for reform must be balanced against the need for speedy action to restore services, which does not allow for a lengthy analysis, consultation and planning exercise”.518 Upon independence, the East Timor civil service was however clearly not capable of ensuring an independent and effective administration. UNTAET did not manage to introduce a legal framework for the civil service, while the Civil Service Act passed by the National Parliament in 2004 is considered an insufficient basis for an independent civil service.519 The development of an effective and neutral civil service nevertheless requires time in a new state. Time is however not the only factor. The Secretary-General acknowledged that progress had been severely hampered by the politicization and centralization of decision-making in the
512 On this issue see Wright, W., ‘Some Land Tenure Issues in Post-Conflict East Timor’, 1 East Timor Law Journal (2006).
513 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2000/53, supra note 491, para. 63.
514 Pritchard, S., ‘United Nations Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction Efforts: New and Continuing Challenges in the Case of East Timor’, 24 University of New South Wales Law Journal 188 (2001).
515 Harrington, A., ‘Ethnicity, Violence, & Land and Property Disputes in Timor-Leste’, 2 East Timor Law Journal (2007).
516 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UN Doc. S/2002/432 (17 April 2002).
517 Dahrendorf et al., supra note 496, para. 210.
518 World Bank, ‘Report of the joint assessment mission to East Timor’ (8 December 1999), para. 17.
519 Zaum, supra note 75, p. 213.
Timorese institutions.520 UNTAET’s early withdrawal left Timor Leste with the burden of continuing civil service reform, while no international organisation was left to enforce a regulatory framework.