D. Squire, The Nautical Institute,UK SUMMARY
Modern technology has revolutionised the way in which a ship is operated, but lack of attention to the human/system interface, in terms of the design, layout and integration of systems, and training in their use, is the root cause of many accidents today. The human element is a critical feature of all aspects of ship or system design and operation. When they eventually board their new ship, the expectations of the crew are of a ship that is ‘fit for purpose’ - designed and built with the user and the operational task in mind, taking into account the environmental conditions that it is likely to encounter during its working life. For any ship to operate safely and effectively, it must be designed to support the people who work it, without detriment to their health, safety and overall performance. The key to improvement is in the close involvement of all stakeholders to ensure that a ship is ‘fit for purpose’, and that the master and his crew are provided with the proper tools and are adequately trained to ensure the safe conduct of the ship and the safe and timely delivery of its cargo.
This paper will look at ship design, safety and operation from a human element perspective.
1. INTRODUCTION
Although the human element has been with us since time immemorial, the issues are not constant. The humans, systems and machines have changed, not only through the increase in technology, but also because of the need for operators to maintain the competitive edge by reducing running costs.
This has resulted in a reduction in manning scales and the employment of multi-national, multicultural and multi-lingual crews, which can lead to differing interpretations of international guidelines and inconsistent standards in lifestyle, training and education.
Furthermore, the introduction of new technology and computer-based systems has changed the way operators are presented with information.
In the maritime industry, human element issues are becoming more critical, because:
x The norms of past experience amongst the seafaring population are not immediately transferable to computer based control systems and other new technologies.
x Competition in shipping services has reduced manning levels so that back up may not be available in critical situations.
x Ships are operating to tighter schedules and to more critical tolerances.
x Ships are becoming more integrated into transport chains, thus the consequences of failure are greater.
x There is growing international public pressure to protect the marine environment.
x The majority of crews are employed from supplier countries having different cultures and languages and differing attitudes towards education and training.
x Shipyards and equipment manufacturers are concerned with optimising their production methods separately and do not always develop integrated, operator- focused systems.
x Ships trials do not adequately test all the ship systems.
x International regulation lags behind the operational needs of modern ship systems.
x There are a variety of ship types (container, passenger, gas etc) that are getting larger such that the consequences of a single failure are more significant.
There are few authoritative documents on the subject of the human element in ship design and operation, which are of use to owners, mariners, designers and builders alike. However, the Nautical Institute’s publication Improving Ship Operational Design [1] goes some way towards addressing these issues. The purpose of this practical guide is to identify the value of good operational design and to demonstrate how the operational design process can be improved.
In his foreword, Dr John Parker, the then President of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects wrote:
‘The aim of the ship designer should be to produce vessels that are not only efficient and cost effective to construct but will be economic and cost effective to operate, whether at sea, or in port whilst loading or discharging. However, many designers lack the practical experience and knowledge of the user and must
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK
© 2007: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects that which pertained a decade or more ago has reduced
this valuable input to the design process.’
The reasons many operational design features become overlooked appears to be because designers do not always understand the significance of operational design criteria and do not manage them through the design process.
An earlier study, conducted by the Nautical Institute [2]
concluded that:
x In many areas designers do not adequately incorporate seamen friendly design features.
x There can be inconsistencies in the whole ship design process because there is no practical way for feedback from seafarers to occur.
x Operational design could only be improved if it became part of the design process, and involved:
The preparation of an initial specification which contains operational design details.
Improving the awareness of design teams about the need for crew user-friendly design.
Managing the overall design process Approving the plans.
Having sea staff standing by new buildings.
Specifying performance criteria and testing the sub-systems not normally covered in ship trials.
Providing ongoing feed back from sea.
2. DESIGN
A ship is unique in that it is not only a place of work, within which there are a number of workspaces - the bridge, the machinery control room, the engine-room, the cargo control room, cargo holds, galley etc - each of which may have different operational criteria, but also it is a ‘home’ to those who work onboard. It is also a floating platform which can be affected by external and internal environmental conditions such as weather, temperature, humidity, noise, vibration and ship motion (pitching, rolling and slamming), any of which can also be detrimental to the safety and performance of those who work and live onboard.
For any ship to operate safely and effectively, therefore, it must be designed to support the people who work it, without detriment to their health, safety and overall performance particularly in respect of:
x Habitability. The provision of adequate and comfortable accommodation – including furnishings and washing facilities - galleys, messrooms and recreational spaces, having due regard for the variations in the size, shape and gender of the seafarer, and for the various environmental stressors such as noise, heat and vibration.
x Maintainability. Designing operational maintenance tasks to be rapid, safe and effective to allow equipment and systems to achieve a specified level of performance. This includes consideration of access, removal routes, tools, expertise, disposal and through-life support.
x Workability. Due consideration must be given to the context of use - the users, tasks, equipment (hardware, software and materials) and the physical and social environments in which a ‘system’ is used. The level and amount of information provided in handbooks must be appropriate to the required technical skills of the user and be written in his/her native language.
x Controllability. Designing the layout of ship control centres, machinery control rooms, cargo control rooms etc, bearing in mind the integration of people with equipment, systems and interfaces, such as communication, controls, displays, alarms, video- display units and computer workstations.
x Manoeuvrability. Having the most appropriate manoeuvring capabilities consistent with the intended role, manning and operating pattern of the ship. These should include the type, number and power of propulsion and steering systems, and thrusters, all having due regard for the environment and fuel economy.
x Survivability. The provision of adequate firefighting, damage control and lifesaving facilities (including manpower) and of security arrangements to ensure the safety and security of the crew, visitors and passengers.
The increasing reliance upon complex systems in merchant ship operations places certain demands and constraints on the human element, not least in terms of the competence of the user and of the organisational and physical environment in which he/she is required to operate.
The human element, therefore, is a critical feature of all aspects of ship or system design and operation. User- input is essential to ensure that the operational parameters and the layout, crewing and procedures for the operation of shipboard systems are being optimised for the specific role or trade of the ship.
Those who are involved in the design, build and updating of ships and their systems and in their operation need
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK
therefore to be aware of the problems associated with onboard operations not only in terms of workplace design but also in respect to crew habitability and the education and training needs of the seafarer.
Human-Centred Design (HCD) - as a science - is a relatively new concept in ship design. The operational experience of the various users and the expert knowledge of a Human Factors specialist can be exploited by the designer to ensure that the number of design errors, often identified during the late stage of build or even when the ship enters operational service, are minimized. The downstream effect will be a reduction in the number of costly ‘change notices’ during build, and in the number of slips, trips, falls, operating errors and other causes of accidents at sea, and an increase in crew satisfaction with their ship.
HCD focuses on making systems usable. It is the process of systematically applying human factors and ergonomics knowledge and techniques to minimize human error, enhance effectiveness and efficiency, improve human working conditions, and counteract possible adverse effects of use on the health, safety and performance of the mariner.
HCD is the means by which the risks arising from a mismatch between seafarers, their ship, its systems and operational procedures are mitigated. To be human- centred entails early and continued focus on the requirements of those people who are going to use a system throughout its life.
User requirements are derived from human factors data considered in the context of the particular ship, its manning, outfitting and operation. A large amount of human factors data is already captured in regulation, standards and organizational knowledge. But, the type and location of human factors data required during the planning and specification of a new ship or ship system is immense. And, for novel human-centred design situations, new equipment or unusual manning, new data may be needed. Who collects this data depends on what it is about and how it can be most beneficial. For example, manufacturers are best placed to collect information on the use of equipment, owners for workspaces, and operating companies for training and manning.
3. BUILD
When they eventually board their new ship, the expectations of the crew are of a ship that is ‘fit for purpose’ - designed and built with the user and the operational task in mind, taking into account the environmental conditions that it is likely to encounter
The seafarer is generally a trusting sort of person, who has implicit faith in those who have conceived, designed and built his ship. His expectations are of a ship that is
‘fit for purpose’ in every respect, but he may not always find that this is the case, because neither he nor any of his predecessors was involved in the design process.
The end product is inevitably a compromise between what is needed to satisfy the regulations, what is absolutely necessary to fulfil the operational role, what is affordable and what the design team perceive to be acceptable to the ‘generic’ seafarer.
But, it is the crew members - and not just the senior officers - who will first spot those irritating design errors, some of which may not be readily identified until sea trials, but which could so easily be rectified before commissioning, such as:
x Critical lines of sight obscured by equipment, machinery or furniture;
x Poor leads for ropes and wires;
x Tripping hazards around the decks;
x Doors that open onto narrow working alleyways;
x Hand rails that are too close to the bulkhead;
x Poor access and removal routes for equipment and machinery.
The practice of using experienced senior crew standing by the ship to undertake checks of systems and equipment is fading fast. Indeed, in some cases, a substantial discount is offered to purchasers who surrender this right. Yet, this discount represents a fraction of the money the yard will save by not being monitored. It is an even smaller fraction of the through- life cost of living with, working around and/or correcting the resulting obstacles to optimum operation of the ship.
One master comments in Alert! [3]:
“Over the years, the length of time spent standing by a new building has been reduced from several months - commencing in the early days of construction - to attending only the final period of fitting out, trials and commissioning. Building yards do not always appreciate the 'interference' of sea staff with advice or thoughts that may delay their building schedule and the method of contract building rarely allows for any changes.
There was a time when the shipyard would first carry out yard trials, followed by owner’s trials - these now seem to be condensed into one with no crew input whatsoever
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK
© 2007: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects It is important for the crew to be familiar with their ship,
well before it leaves the builder’s yard. Those who have to operate the various systems must be properly trained on them; they should not be expected to ‘pick it up’ after they have joined the ship, or accept a quick briefing on it from the commissioning engineer, or simply read the handbook.
Additional monitoring is required if the Human Element is to be successfully addressed during build, in order to ensure that:
x The manufacturer has followed the standards for the intrinsic ergonomic properties of working and living spaces and equipment. This includes health and safety issues from Class, Flag and ILO.
x The designer has taken account of necessary attributes, context of use (user, task, physical and social environment) and maintainability of the layout and ship's sub-systems. In addition to good operational design this includes the requirements of Class, Flag and ILO, for operational safety.
x Typical crew can perform the intended working procedures with the equipment provided.
And
x That the ship operable in terms of the effectiveness, productivity, acceptability and safety of the crew's work
4. INTEGRATING THE HUMAN ELEMENT The crew form an essential part of the operational ship system. Integration includes ensuring that they are recruited, trained and worked according to the assumptions behind the specification.
Integrating the Human Element into a complex system such as a ship is a bit like putting together a jigsaw puzzle. There are many component parts, some of which are readily identifiable and easy to link together such that the semblance of a picture soon begins to form. There are, however, others that are not so obvious, and it takes a certain amount of ‘trial and error’ to fit them into the right slots until, eventually, the whole picture is complete.
A ship comprises of a number of component parts (systems) each of which will have some effect on the overall performance of that ship. The extent to which a system will have such effect will depend on how critical it is to the safety of the ship and to its crew.
Some systems may be fully automated, but they will still require a degree of intervention from the seafarer, whether it is to set the initial tolerances or to respond to alarms. Some may require direct seafarer input for their
operation and for their maintenance. Others will require humans to interact with other humans, and some may be driven by ‘outside influences’ such as the environment, other humans, or technology.
Furthermore, the shipboard environment requires seafarers from a variety of cultural backgrounds to work, socialise and live harmoniously with one another.
The process of integrating the Human Element into this complex system starts at conception, but it does not stop there. It is a dynamic process, which must be kept under review throughout the lifecycle of the ship to take account of, for example, changes in its operating pattern, system updates, improved technology and new regulation.
Any of these can have an effect on the key domains of human factors engineering and human resources. Human factors engineering takes into account the interests and needs of the crew, especially in respect of the six
‘abilities’ (habitability, maintainability, workability, controllability, manoeuvrability, survivability), occupational health and safety and system safety. And, the human resources process considers the mix, number and competency requirements for the crew.
The crew form an essential part of the operational ship system. Integration includes ensuring that they are recruited, trained and worked according to the assumptions behind the specification. ISM requires assessment of the risk to operability from any change.
Operability must be evaluated - it affects the bottom line.
Poor effectiveness means human error; lack of productivity means inefficient use of limited manpower;
safety problems mean compensation or increased premiums; and low acceptability decreases motivation.
Ultimately, the aim is to achieve a balanced development of both the technological and human aspects of the ship’s operational capability, in order to ensure the safe conduct of the ship, the safe and timely delivery of its cargo; and, a safe, happy and healthy working and living environment for the crew.
There are many stakeholders involved in the design and build of ships and their systems. Teamwork and communication at all levels, from concept to build, are essential to the success of any design/build project.
5. THE EFFECTS OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY
Modern technology has revolutionised the way in which seafarer conducts his business. Today, he can be presented with a plethora of information, from a variety of stand-alone systems having differing user interfaces, with the potential for confusion and information overload, particularly if he is not properly acquainted
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK
with the operational parameters of any one of those systems.
Lack of attention to the human-system interface, in terms of the design, layout, and integration of systems, and training in their use, is said to be the root cause of many accidents today.
Although, in principle, the more information that can be made available to the seafarer the better should be his understanding of the situation and the better informed his decision-making, this is not entirely the case in practice.
It is probable that technology is having an adverse effect on the way in which some seafarers conduct their business. There are various reasons for this, not least the universal problem of a generation of seafarers that is being brought up to rely on technology to solve problems without having to think for themselves.
Although equipments are type approved and IMO compliant to minimum performance standards, there is a natural tendency for manufacturers to add their own features, in an attempt to make their equipment ‘user- friendly’. For example, the seafarer can be faced with either joystick, trackball or menu-driven controls, depending on the equipment fit in the vessel in which he is serving.
Yet, the different nationalities and cultures of today’s seafarers (and of those of the future) dictate a need for commonality of symbols, switches and control keys, together with appropriate education in the basic principles of new technology.
But, what is critical is how technology is safely managed.
It would seem that there is a modern trend towards
‘technology push’ rather than ‘market pull’ such that very advanced technology and integrated systems are being put into ships with the risk of over-saturating the untrained seafarer with information which may be replicated through different means.
Systems should not be complex or sophisticated – the simpler the operation of any system is for the seafarer, the better he will be able to extract the information obtained from it and use it in a safe and efficient manner.
The seafarer needs to be trained on new technology and equipment; he should not be expected to pick it up after he has joined the vessel, or to undergo familiarisation by other staff onboard, who themselves have no formal training or qualifications in the use of such equipment.
But, the tendency for seafarers to move from one ship type to another, where each has different equipment fits, makes it impractical for them to be properly trained in
standard so as to allow for a generic training programme for all the different systems.
There is a perception that the regulators, manufacturers, shipbuilders and owners are dictating to the user what he must have rather than the user advising them as to his needs; and, that all too often, procedures and training are task specific for a piece of equipment rather than as a whole, and are not generated by the end-user. The user- input is essential to ensure that the layout and the procedures for the operation of shipboard systems are being optimised for the specific role or trade of the ship.
There is a clear need to raise awareness across the industry – designers, engineers, owners/managers, trainers/educators, insurers, regulators etc - of human element issues related to the use of technology and automation, particularly in regard to training.
Such is the concern within the IMO about how mariners interact with technology, that the Maritime Safety Committee has issued MSC Circular 1091 - Issues to be considered when introducing new technology on board ship.
It serves to remind stakeholders of the various aspects to be considered with respect to how seafarers interact with the technology and of the issues to be considered when assessing their training needs.
Specific areas of advice include:
x The effects on non-standardization of controls and displays
x The challenges in training for technology
x The need to take the human element into account when introducing new technology This Circular invites member governments to bring this advice to the attention of all concerned. It should be essential reading for those who are involved in the introduction of new information technology into ships.
Furthermore, training must be an integral part of the introduction of new technology and equipment and it must be defined in advance and by statute.
6. EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION
It is now fact that multi-national crews are a common feature aboard more than 65% of the world’s merchant ships, where the commonly used language onboard may not be the native language of the majority of the crew.[5]
This inevitably leads to communication problems, which