M Lỹtzhửft, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden B Sherwood Jones, Process Contracting Limited, UK J V Earthy, Lloyd’s Register, UK
C. Bergquist, Kalmar Maritime Academy, Sweden SUMMARY
MTO-sea is a project which aims to close feedback loops between the practitioners on board and the manufacturers and regulators ashore. BWith some education in basic usability and ergonomics, cadets can provide useful information to many stakeholders, including the academy. This paper reports on the first cycle of a programme of which the ultimate goal is better workplaces on board and safer shipping systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
The authors believe that the industry should do more than just teach operators not to make mistakes, thereby avoiding becoming a source of ‘human error’. Safety management needs to balance centralized planning with enabling people to handle uncertainties locally [1], illustrated in Figure 1.
Balance through loose coupling Autonomy
"Safety through human action"
Central Supervision
"Safety despite human error"
Figure 1: Balancing autonomy and central supervision (after Grote, [1]).
The requirement is to equip seafarers to be a central component in nested, resilient systems. The MTO-Sea project aims to address this, by understanding the challenges posed by modern bridge equipment and the ways in which the crew adapt to make best use of it. The stakeholders in this endeavour are many and diverse;
cadets – new officers, teachers and staff at maritime academies, personnel at shipping companies, regulators, manufacturers and researchers.
2. BACKGROUND
The professional seafarer has always had to make the best use of the tools available to achieve commercial success without sacrificing the safety margin. At times, this capability cannot be maintained. The rapid introduction of computer systems for navigation is crudely indicated by the increase from 22 to 40 items of equipment specified at the main workstations between 1990 and now [2, 3]. The number of tools and their variants make it hard for mariners to keep up-to-date on their job function and its task requirements, academies
cannot keep up, and learning on the job has inherent risks.
There have been incidents attributed to the mismatch between the seafarer and the technical systems. These are very similar to incidents in other sectors brought about by ‘clumsy automation’. In some ways, bridge automation is repeating the pattern in aircraft cockpits.
Relatively little is known about how operators at the sharp end [4] cope with modern software-intensive systems and the accumulation of equipment to be found on many bridges. The crew can modify and adapt bridge equipment, they can find ways of coping with equipment that is undependable or difficult to use, and find ways of dealing with shortfalls in documentation, procedures etc.
Descriptions of the blunt end have reflected the formal organisation, either as nested systems [5] or as levels [6].
However, in practical operation, shipping is best considered as a system of systems. A simplified set of technical systems would include equipment design and supply, ship design and construction, and ship operation.
Other systems would be concerned with e.g. crew supply and training. Each system has its own regulation.
Feedback loops and data gathering are vital for the dynamic control of risk. The organisation in control needs “requisite imagination” – the ability to anticipate when and how calamity might strike. It needs to be able to detect ‘weak signals’ – to have a good early warning system. The sharp end needs to adapt minute by minute, day by day, while the outer loops (the blunt end) operate on much longer time constants. A greatly simplified model of regulation of bridge design is shown at Figure 2 (at end of paper).
3. METHOD
One class of final year cadets at Kalmar Maritime Academy was presented with the opportunity to participate in the project. It was described as voluntary and not too time-consuming. In total, the cadets were given three lectures (of about 2 hours each) before they left for their final on-board practice period. These
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK
practice periods are integrated in their education. The lectures consisted of information about the project, an introduction to ethics, basic scientific concepts and a lecture on data collection methods which included exercises. During these lectures it was pointed out that the crew on their ships should be informed of their right to not participate and that care should be taken to preserve anonymity when needed. An overview of usability and human factors was given, followed by a practical evaluation exercise (school ship and simulator environment) after which the students presented their findings. The cadets were given a “log book” to use as a basis for their data collection. They were briefed on how to use it, and it was supplied in electronic as well as in printed form. The cadets were also given a small digital camera to take pictures of the bridge and issues of interest. These lectures and preparations were performed in the first half of 2006.
The study was to be performed in three stages, the first on or soon after arrival onboard and the second and third as the cadet became more familiar with the ship and the crew. The three stages were: description, discussion, dynamics. First, the students would describe the bridge and associated working spaces by drawing, or copying drawings. On these, they should fill in the position of the technical bridge equipment. They should fill in whether different kinds of tasks were performed, such as main work station, trip planning and communication. At the back of the log book a numbered list of bridge equipment was provided to help with this task.
The discussion part consisted of a set of simple questions, such as “what is the newest equipment on the bridge” and “what is the best/worst”. Each main question was supplemented with follow-up questions such as when did it come onboard, where is it placed, how were the crew prepared/trained etc. The cadets were asked to perform a SUS (System Usability Scale) evaluation [7]
on the equipment named as the worst or the best. The evaluation provides a value between 1 and 100, which in itself is not a stand-alone meaningful value but can be used for comparisons. In this section, cadets were also instructed to look for modifications, such as instructions or notes, but also home-made solutions to some problem – such as coverings for screens or buttons/lights that cannot be dimmed enough at night, or custom-made tables or holders for equipment. These modifications provide clues to working practices or equipment and tools which the crew consider necessary for safe and efficient bridge work but which were not originally included in the design.
For the dynamics section, the cadets were instructed to use, if allowed, and/or to observe in use, the bridge equipment. The aim was to encourage them to think about the interaction with bridge equipment The log
things that are frustrating to use. A number of pointers were supplied from a LR checklist used to assess ship’s bridges. Finally, cadets were asked to record any surprising and/or unexpected use of equipment.
To complement the data collected by cadets, three ship visits were performed by senior researchers in the project. The first visit also served as a pilot study of the log book, and a few small amendments were made to the log book after this trip and distributed to the cadets.
4. PROCEDURE
18 cadets out of a class of 42 volunteered to participate.
Most of the cadets spent time on two ships during the on- board period (in total about 3 months). When all the students had returned, to start the spring term of 2007, they were invited to a debriefing session. To the extent that material had been handed in before this meeting, photographs and other data were discussed to extract more information. Some material was handed in during or after the debriefing, and was also analysed – after follow-up contacts with the cadet as necessary. To date, 8 log books have been handed in, with a large number of photographs.
5. RESULTS
The results may be divided into two categories; the outcome of the project as such, so far, and the contents of the data gathered by the cadets and researchers.
5.1 THE PROJECT
For a first trial the results are reasonable. The volunteer rate was about 42% and of those the response rate was (to date) 44%. The most satisfying result is that several students mentioned that they started “seeing with new eyes” and as this shift in perspective sinks in we would say this is a first indicator of success. It is a great result to be able to change, or complement, the thinking of crew members about their ships as a workplace, and to confer the insight that they can participate in making it safer and better.
5.2 THE COLLECTED DATA
Some interesting trends can be seen in the data. However, one should be aware that “you get what you ask for”. The examples given in the lectures preceding the data collection turned up frequently in the cadet data. It may be that that follow-up lectures are needed to take the cadets and/or officers a further step. The present data does constitute a validation of the studies of e.g., [8].
Frequent findings are lamps and lights that cannot be
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK
© 2007: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects one in figure 2. This is a problem which has been with us for some time and which must be solved. Not only does the bright light disturb night vision, but it is an irritant on a psychological level.
Figure 2: A custom-made paper dimmer. Please note the holes that constitute the positioning arrangement.
Another common modification is notes and memos posted on various surfaces, many of them laying down procedures, but others are reminders. Reminder notes may be regarded as a pointer to equipment that is not optimised for the task and the context. One example is shown in figure 3. Reminders like these indicate that the system is not well-designed. In this specific example one can easily imagine the consequences of not performing this action, firstly leading to a mechanical failure, costly in itself, and secondly in the worst scenario leading to a grounding or collision (after the bow thruster fails).
Figure 3: Reminder notes can reveal bad system design.
Other comments concern the creeping evolution of the bridge into an office where other work than traditional bridge work is performed. This is something we may all agree is going on, but the impromptu office spaces offer neither good lookout positions, nor an ergonomic workplace. A decision must be made at some level, that if administrative work is to be performed on the bridge, safe lookout should be considered and an efficient workplace must be provided. Not all this work is new work, but work which was previously performed
“manually” by filling in forms – such as weather reports and position reports. Other examples include the acquisition of weather information; frequently a computer is used, instead of weather faxes and the like.
Since weather faxes tended to be placed in obscure places, perhaps with some thought we may even increase the safety of navigation and the possibilities to keep a good lookout.
As more and more equipment is moved to the bridge, we must make sure that it can be incorporated into the workplace. Many off-the-shelf office tools are placed on the bridge that are not constructed for on-board use, nor
easy to integrate with the ongoing work, such as faxes, copy machines, computers and screens. There are several issues to consider; lighting, alarms and general suitability, for instance. Meanwhile, these additions are taped to desks and bulkheads, break due to vibration, are un- dimmable and give off nuisance alarms (e.g. out of paper).
6. FUTURE WORK
A seminar will be held with representatives from industry as well as the academy and the cadets, to present and discuss the results of this first cycle. This meeting will be the forum where the cadets will start to learn to whom feedback and views should be directed, and in which form e.g. economical arguments may work with a shipping company technical director, safety arguments for an administration.
The programme will be continuously taught at Kalmar Maritime Academy and there are plans to implement it at Chalmers University of Technology (these are Sweden’s two Maritime Academies). Further analysis on the data continues, and will become more comprehensive and valid with each cycle of the project.
The classes and log book are being reworked and revised to fit engineer cadets. The engine room and engine control room are seriously under-researched; see Andersson & Lỹtzhửft [these proceedings].
7. CONCLUSIONS
The study will help the Academy to keep its training and education of future officers up to date. Staff and teachers at maritime academies will get information on how to teach that safety is something that is made, not given. A long-term benefit for the academies is that this study will provide operational feedback – like any academic department which sends students into the field to collect data (for example geology and sociology departments).
The study will also provide useful feedback to the shipping companies involved in Swedish cadet training.
Feedback will be provided to industry, manufacturers, regulators and other interested parties. Manufacturers often want specific feedback on specific issues. We know from earlier studies that technology manufacturers agree on the importance of feedback from seafaring personnel on the use and context of use for their respective equipment. However, it is hard to get feedback from this group, and especially so from those sailing the high seas.
This study will get feedback on user aspects of their equipment. It is an open question in what format they wish to receive this kind of operational feedback.
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK
The project aims to build lifelong learning links, enabling the professional development of the cadets and future officers, and make contributions to the industry.
8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The study is a co-operation between Kalmar Maritime Academy, VTI (The Swedish National Road and Transportation Research Institute), Lloyds Register and C.N.S. Systems AB.
9. REFERENCES
1. GROTE, G., ‘Uncertainty management at the core of system design’ Annual Reviews in Control 28 267–274, 2004
2. ISO 8468:1990 Ship's bridge layout and associated equipment - Requirements and guidelines. 1990
3. ISO FDIS 8468 Ship's bridge layout and associated equipment - Requirements and guidelines. 1996
4. COOK, R.I., WOODS, D.D., ‘Operating at the sharp end: the complexity of human error’. In:
Bogner MS., ed. Human error in medicine. (pp.
255–310) L. Erlbaum; p, 1994.
5. MORAY, N. ‘Error reduction as a systems problem’ in Bognor (Ed) Human Error in Medicine, (pp 67-91) L. Erlbaum. 1994
6. RASMUSSEN, J. ‘Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem’, Safety Science Volume 27, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 183- 213(31). 1997
7. BROOKE, J. SUS: a "quick and dirty" usability scale. In P W Jordan, B Thomas, B A Weerdmeester & A L McClelland (eds.) Usability Evaluation in Industry. London: Taylor and Francis. 1996
8. LĩTZHệFT, M.H. "The technology is great when it works": Maritime Technology and Human Integration on the Ship's Bridge. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Linkửping University, Linkửping.
2004
10. AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES
Margareta Lỹtzhửft is an Associate Professor in the Human Factors group at the Department of Shipping and Marine Technology at Chalmers University in Gothenburg. She is a master mariner, and in 2004 she received a PhD in Human-Machine Interaction. Her focus is Human-Machine interaction on the bridge and she is involved in several other projects such as fatigue studies.
margareta.lutzhoft@chalmers.se
Brian Sherwood Jones is an independent Human Factors consultant who has supported Lloyd’s Register's Human Factors activities for a number of years. After working in the aircraft industry, he worked at YARD Ltd and its successors for fourteen years, prior to setting up Process Contracting Ltd. in 1999. He has specialised in the Human Factors Integration of complex systems.
brian@processforusability.co.uk
Jonathan Earthy is principal human factors specialist for Lloyd's Register. He joined Lloyd's Register in 1992 after ten years with British Petroleum. After working in a range of projects and jobs related to safety and information technology, Jonathan is now responsible for coordinating Lloyd's Register's Marine research and development with respect to the Human Element and Systems Engineering. He represents the UK interests in international standards committees for Ergonomics, Marine systems and system and software engineering.
jonathan.earthy@lr.org
Christer Bergquist has a background as Master Mariner with several years experience as Master onboard various vessels. He was employed by Argonaut AB in Stockholm, Sweden first as Marine and Safety Manager and later also as Fleet Manager. He now holds a position at the Maritime Academy in Kalmar as Senior Lecturer and is responsible for the institution’s Research and Development department.
christer.bergquist@hik.se
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK
© 2007: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects 11. APPENDIX
Supply chain
Equipt
Suppliers Yard
Ship & crew CLASS PSC
FLAG
ISM IMO
IEC
?
CLASS IMO
R&D IACS
P&I External, major incidents
NGOs e.g. NI, IMPA, RINA, RIN, IMarEST Science, technology, research
Owne r
Figure. 4: Simplified model of regulation of bridge design and equipment.
Key: IACS: International Association of Classification Societies, IEC: International Electrotechnical Commission, IMarEST: Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology, IMO: International Maritime Organisation, IMPA: International Maritime Pilots’
Association, ISM: International Safety Management System, NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation, NI: Nautical Institute P&I:
Protection & Indemnity, PSC: Port State Control, RIN: Royal Institute of Navigation, RINA: Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and Operation, London, UK