4 Interpretation and modi fi cation
6.2 How are the sources of international law justified?
6.2.2 Deduction: Alfred Verdross and natural law as fi ctional
The next two sections will portray a polarised view of two theoretical approaches to international law. They are both extreme in the sense that from the point of view of the Pure Theory of Law they are both removed from its synthesis or middle ground. Yet, the actual writings of Verdross and Hart natually contain qualifiers and details. In order to show their incompatibility with the normativist- positivist theory espoused here – in the Pure Theory’s parlance: their ‘failure’ to correctly grasp the nature of norms – their position will be thrown into somewhat sharper relief than they themselves have done.
The objection may be made that the choice of the two scholars to represent
62 Menon (1986) supra note 31 at 181–214 at 182: ‘Nowhere it is laid down that the list in Article 38 is exhaustive, hence it is possible to have other sources of law’; Neuhold (2004) supra note 25 at 31 (RN 169); Parry (1965) supra note 25 at 109; Pauwelyn (2003) supra note 10 at 90; Virally (1968) supra note 25 at 122.
63 Parry (1965) supra note 25 at 5.
64 E.g.: Verdross and Simma (1984) supra note 23 at 321–412; Jennings and Watts (1992) supra note 25 at 24; Pathak (1979) supra note 57 at 484.
65 Such as ‘certain decisions of international organizations’. Maarten Bos, The hierarchy among the recognised manifestations (‘sources’) of international law, 25 Netherlands International Law Review (1978) 334–344 at 334.
Uncertainty in International Law 210
deduction and induction was unwise. It may very well be argued that neither Verdross nor Hart are archetypical representatives of natural law scholarship or of traditional positivism. Their importance, their frequent references to Kelsen together with their self-reflective and self-conscious approach, however, make them better candidates than someone whose theory may be more sharply defined, but less well thought-out.
Deduction seeks to base the source of (international) law on a higher instance.
Sources are not based on decisions by organs authorised by the legal order in quesiton, but on an external normative order – natural law, for example – whose norms are not created by human willing. It could, in a sense, be argued that deduction’s problems are less grave than induction’s. Deductive theories can be interpreted to respect the nature of norms, their ideal existence and their non- factuality. This type of theory can potentially keep norms apart from facts, the ideal from the real. Kant certainly believed that of the two ethico-theoretical poles – empiricism and mysticism – the former was more dangerous than the latter:
However, the caution against empiricism of practical reason is much more important, for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity and sublimity of the moral law, and, besides, it is not very natural or agreeable to common habits of thought to strain one’s imagination to supersensible intuitions; and hence the danger on this side is not so general. Empiricism, on the contrary, cuts up at the roots the morality of intentions . . ., and substitutes for duty something quite different, namely, an empirical interest, with which the inclinations generally are secretly leagued . . .66
This, however, is a point which needs to be proven. What is more, far more scholars today hold relatively clear inductive views than purely deductive views.
While natural law may still be popular in a subdued form, a derivation of a legal system from pure reason or God’s will alone cannot be found. An element of human interaction is present in every theory. Also, the main problem of inductive approaches is far more easily overlooked and muddled with a bit of creative writing than that of deduction. It is easy to say that one merely wishes to ‘ground’
a theory in ‘the facts of life’.
Alfred Verdross is among the most important international legal scholars of the twentieth century.67 The development of his position over more than 60 years
66 ‘Indessen ist die Verwahrung vor dem Empirismus der praktischen Vernunft viel wichtiger und anratungswürdiger, weil der Mystizismus sich doch noch mit der Reinigkeit und Erhabenheit des moralischen Gesetzes zusammen vertrọgt und auòerdem es nicht eben natỹrlich und der gemeinen Denkungsart angemessen ist, seine Einbildungskraft bis zu übersinnlichen Anschauungen anzuspannen, mithin auf dieser Seite die Gefahr nicht so allgemein ist; da hingegen der Empiris- mus die Sittlichkeit in Gesinnungen . . . mit der Wurzel ausrottet, und ihr ganz etwas anderes, nọmlich ein empirisches Interesse, womit die Neigungen ỹberhaupt unter sich Verkehr treiben, statt der Pflicht unterschiebt . . .’; Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788) A 125–126, AA V 71 (translation Thomas Kingsmill Abbott).
67 The European Journal of International Law has included him in the series of symposia held on
‘The European Tradition of International Law’ (in: 6 European Journal of International Law (1995) 32–115).
6.2.2 A constitution for international law 211
is important due to the remarkable closeness this natural lawyer maintained to the normativist positivism of the Vienna School. While we will give an overview of the core of his natural law theory below, we must first ask why scholars would adopt a natural law theory and justification. Kelsen expressed it well in an article on the topic from 1963.
The subjectivity and relativity of ‘value’ is a consequence which is hard to take for some . . . If the validity of a norm, with which we can often comply only with a great effort, because compliance goes against our inclinations, is in the end based upon an arbitrary decision and if, therefore, the validity of a contrary norm is by no means excluded, one’s trust in the goodness of one’s behaviour in complying with that norm is not as high as in the truth of a statement [of fact]. Also, however, . . . because one is not disposed to believe that the authority and thus the motivating force of a moral or legal order is sufficient if the humans subject to these orders hold that the values constituted by them are merely subjective and relative. This is how [we can explain] the attempt to prove the validity of norms, which are not . . . ‘posited’, which do not have to be
‘positive’, in order to be valid, which are binding by virtue of their content, which are binding directly and independently from the will of a human and which constitute values, which are as objective as the truth of statements about reality.68
6.2.2.1 Verdrossian natural law theory
Alfred Verdross explicitly bases his natural law theory on Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas.69 For Aristotle, all entities strive towards their perfection, because only if and when they have reached that goal (telos), they have reached their true nature (physis). Thus, all beings or entities have an imminent purpose (or goal) – this
68 ‘Die Subjektivitọt und Relativitọt des Wertes ist aber eine Konsequenz, die fỹr viele . . . schwer zu ertragen ist. . . . Wenn die Geltung einer Norm, der wir – oft nur unter gewaltiger Anstrengung, weil gegen unsere Neigungen – entsprechen, sich als letzten Endes willkürlich erweist und daher die Geltung einer entgegengesetzten Norm keineswegs ausschlieòt, ist man des Wertes seines, einer solchen Norm entsprechenden Verhaltens nicht so sicher wie die Wahrheit einer Aussage. Dann aber . . ., weil man die Autoritọt und damit die motivierende Kraft einer Moral- oder Rechtsord- nung nicht fỹr hinreichend họlt, wenn die diesen Ordnungen unterworfenen Menschen die durch die Normen dieser Ordnungen konstituierten Werte nur für subjektiv und relativ halten. Daher der Versuch, die Geltung von Normen nachzuweisen, die nicht . . . “gesetzt”, nicht “positiv” sein mỹssen, um zu gelten, die, kraft ihres Inhalts, unmittelbar und unabhọngig von dem Willen eines Menschen verbindlich sind und die Werte konstituieren, die so objektiv sind wie die Wahrheit von Aussagen über die Wirklichkeit.’ Hans Kelsen, Die Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre, 13 ệsterreichische Zeitschrift fỹr ửffentliches Recht (1963) 1–37, reprinted in: Hans Klecatsky, Renộ Marcic, Herbert Schambeck (eds), Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule. Ausgewọhlte Schriften von Hans Kelsen, Adolf Julius Merkl, Alfred Verdross (1968) 869–912 at 872–873.
69 In the first edition of ‘Abendlọndische Rechtsphilosophie’ of 1958, the Aristotelian foundation is already quite clear, whereas in an important paper of 1931 (Alfred Verdross, Die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsọtze als Vửlkerrechtsquelle. Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Problem der Grundnorm des positiven Vửlkerrechts, in: Alfred Verdross (ed.), Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht. Untersuchungen zur reinen Rechtslehre. Festschrift Hans Kelsen zum 50. Geburtstage gewidmet (1931) 354–365) the tone is resolutely natural-lawyerly, but there is no mention of Aristotle or Thomas.
Uncertainty in International Law 212
purpose-oriented nature is their entelechia.70 This, then, is an objective nature. The teleological metaphysics of Aristotle alone, however, do not yet amount to much in the sphere of practical philosophy. The crucial ‘twist’ comes when he considers the nature of humans. Human telos is (forms) a norm which they have to observe in order to reach completion – the goal prescribes the means.71 Thus, an Is (human nature) alone creates an Ought (an objective norm).72 Human nature is societal (man as a zoon politikón, as a state-building being): ‘[Human beings] thus by their nature are directed towards community with other humans.’73
Like Aristotle, Verdross sees human nature in this particular objective and teleological sense. Human nature is not simply a neutral ‘Is’, Verdross contends;
our nature has an inherent moral sense (Wertbewuòtsein) that guides us toward certain goals.74 It may be difficult to accept this different and pre-modern mean- ing of the term ‘nature’. Verdross points out that if one takes it to mean a post- Kantian ‘mere causally linked phenomena in space and time’,75 the deduction of Ought from Is cannot work. He is clearly hinting at Kelsen’s neo-Kantian epistemology, which distinguishes between noumena and phenomena.76 Yet it is exactly this pre-Kantian-revolution belief in the absolute entity, in this case in the telos – the goal or purpose within matter – that makes Verdross differ from Kelsen. Verdross takes ‘nature’ to include not only causal, but also final connec- tions (what he calls the ‘the whole of reality’),77 because ‘reality’ includes the Aristotelian form (eidos) besides matter, telos besides existence. Because nature in this metaphysical tradition is not simply that of a physical nature, the term to an extent becomes counterfactual and is not simply existence, but constitutes an Ought of sorts.
The connection to the existence of an objective normative order – to natural law – is made, as with Aristotle, through the social nature of man. Human finality is peculiarily self-conscious, because humans have the ability to abstract and there- fore to cognise causal connection of events, which means that we know which forces to bring to bear to reach a set goal.78 In a move typical of natural law scholarship, Verdross postulates that the preservation and development of human life is this general and natural goal; furthermore, that under this telos the objective value of society and its order cannot be denied.79 He argues that ‘empirische
70 Alfred Verdross, Abendlọndische Rechtsphilosophie. Ihre Grundlagen und Hauptprobleme in geschichtlicher Schau (1958) 39–40.
71 Alfred Verdross, Statisches und dynamisches Naturrecht (1971) 98–99.
72 Verdross (1958) supra note 70 at 40; Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 20–21.
73 ‘[Der Mensch] ist also durch die Dynamik seiner Natur auf die Gesellschaft mit anderen Menschen hingerichtet.’ Verdross (1958) supra note 70 at 41.
74 Verdross (1955) supra note 22 at 20.
75 ‘bloò kausal verknỹpfte Erscheinungen in Raum und Zeit’; Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 60.
In the same vein, but asserting the opposite opinion: Kelsen (1960) supra note 7 at 227 (RR 34 j).
76 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781, 1787) A 235–260, B 294–315.
77 ‘Gesamtheit der Wirklichkeit’; Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 60.
78 Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 61.
79 Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 64, 61.
6.2.2 A constitution for international law 213
Wertlehre’ – a kind of social science of values – shows these basic values to be such as determined by human nature.80 It is questionable whether a social science could actually provide the data for the metaphysical presupposition of eidos. It is even more problematic to see ‘preservation and development of human life’
as constituting human nature, worse still to connect this goal to society by a mere assertion.
Natural law as objective normative order is derived from these existential goals of human nature,81 because natural law (through the transformation from Is to Ought) has the purpose of ordering human cohabitation so that humans can live in dignity. Verdross argues that this telos can be proven empirically, ‘because all [humans] actually strive towards it’.82 Thus natural law as objective principles of human interaction which can be ascertained rationally83 (practical reason) is created. Verdross admits, however, that this is only the case:
if one acknowledges with Aristotle that humans as social beings can found a legal community to secure their existence, to advance their [personal] development and to make it possible to lead a life with human dignity.84
How does Verdross envisage the relationship between natural law and positive legal orders? Here his early membership of the Vienna School of Jurisprudence shows clear traces and here we can at least reconstruct how, if not why Verdross came to be a natural lawyer. Verdross may have been disappointed with the hypo- thetical nature of the Grundnorm. As early as 1926 he writes that with the help of the basic norm we can only presuppose or feign the validity of a positive legal order, but never prove its objective validity. His frustration with the Pure Theory’s relativism is palpable when he demands that the Grundnorm has to be a ‘norm anchored in the cosmos of values’85 and that the Grundnorm cannot be a legal philosopher’s last word on the topic.86
Therefore, the Grundnorm for Verdross is not a legal-scientific assumption (a Kantian category of cognition) as with Kelsen, but a norm of natural law, both basing positive law in objective values and founding the validity of positive law.87 The Grundnorm not only empowers some humans to create positive law, but also – and here, again, is a typical natural law element – limits that power by reference to the objective values established by the superior natural legal order.88
80 Verdross (1955) supra note 22 at 20.
81 Verdross (1955) supra note 22 at 20.
82 ‘da es tatsọchlich von allen angestrebt wird’; Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 62.
83 Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 92, 100.
84 ‘wenn man mit Aristoteles anerkennt, daò die Menschen als soziale Wesen eine Rechtsgemein- schaft begrỹnden kửnnen, um ihre Existenz zu sichern, ihre Entfaltung zu fửrdern und ein menschenwỹrdiges Leben zu ermửglichen.’ Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 94–95.
85 ‘im Kosmos der Werte verankerte Norm’; Verdross (1926) supra note 14 at 31.
86 Verdross (1926) supra note 14 at 32.
87 Verdross (1926) supra note 14 at 24.
88 Verdross (1955) supra note 22 at 21.
Uncertainty in International Law 214
This theory of the relationship between natural law and positive law remained the same throughout Verdross’ long career as a scholar. The application of that theory to the concrete relationship of natural law to international law, however, varies. In the 1920s, Verdross holds that the Grundnorm of international law and indirectly (due to his monistic theory of the relationship of international law to municipal law)89 of all law is the norm ‘pacta sunt servanda’, which, in turn, is part of the natural legal order.90 In the 1930s to 1950s we find him arguing that the general principles of law91 fulfil that role, or at least that natural law makes them the highest echelon of positive international law.92 Later still, that crucial role – with a different theoretical basis and modified to some extent by Bruno Simma – is fulfilled by an original consensus, to which we will turn at a later juncture (Section 6.3.1).
The point here is that we need not look at the various concepts in detail, because the basic theory remains the same. The highest echelons of positive international law – its sources – are determined by natural law, which, in turn, is determined by the objective nature of man. In order for Verdross to reconcile his natural legal construct with the Pure Theory, he seeks to distinguish between different sorts of validity. He argues that validity of positive law as positive-legal validity is different to its validity as natural-legal validity. For a natural lawyer such as Verdross, only the latter can be a truly normative validity, while the creation of law in accordance with its (positive) meta-law of law-creation (‘posi- tivrechtlich ordnungsmọòige Erzeugung’) is belittled as an effluence of socio- logical effectiveness.93
Yet Verdross nonetheless claims that Kelsen’s theory and his are commensurable:94
[The Pure] Theory of Law therefore can exist beside a natural law theory, because it only tries to give a value-free analysis of positive law, while natural law theory seeks to solve the problem of the value of positive law, i.e. its justice or injustice. This is a problem that lies outside the scope of Kelsen’s legal theory.95
Verdross and Kelsen are to an extent incommensurable and Verdross’ search for a
89 E.g.: Verdross (1923) supra note 16.
90 Verdross (1926) supra note 14 at 27–28, 31.
91 As codified in Articles 38(3) and 38(1)(c) of the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the International Court of Justice, respectively.
92 Verdross (1931) supra note 69 at 362, 364; Verdross (1955) supra note 22 at 22–25.
93 Verdross (1931) supra note 69 at 357; Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 107.
94 Verdross (1955) supra note 22 at 19; Verdross (1958) supra note 70 at 253–254; Verdross (1971) supra note 71 at 94.
95 ‘[Die Reine] Rechtslehre kann deshalb neben einer Naturrechtslehre bestehen, da sie nur auf eine wertfreie Analyse des positiven Rechts zielt, wọhrend die Naturrechtslehre das Problem des Wertes des positiven Rechts, das heiòt seiner Gerechtigkeit oder Ungerechtigkeit zu lửsen sucht, ein Problem, das auòerhalb der von Kelsen vertretenen Rechtslehre liegt.’ Verdross (1958) supra note 70 at 253.
6.2.2 A constitution for international law 215
‘symbiotic model’96 was in vain. While a full critique will be attempted in the next section, the Pure Theory cannot, as Verdross believes, be reduced to an analysis of ‘legal manifestations’. In order to cognise norms as norms, one necessarily has to presuppose a Grundnorm, which works as a cognitive tool.97 In order to perceive any normative order as norms, one needs to presuppose a Grundnorm, including for a natural legal order.98 This ‘perception’ of a norm is its validity and it founds its ‘ideal existence’. Thus one could partially disagree with Verdross’ statement.
The Pure Theory does found validity, but only on an ‘as if’ basis. Verdross is correct insofar as the Pure Theory does not purport to necessarily found one particular normative order (e.g. a legal order called ‘international law’) on another normative order (‘natural law’), which Verdross’ theory does. But the hypothetical (‘as if’) validity is wholly sufficient to sustain the ideal existence – validity – of norms and one could argue that any further foundation, even if found in ‘the cosmos of values’, is superfluous. But then, of course, Verdross’ metaphysical basis is different to Kelsen’s.
Thus we can see the deductive reasoning of Verdross in developing his natural law theory and with it his justification of the sources of international law. From an objective Is that contains a teleological element – human nature as a zoon politikón – is deduced an objective value, from which, in turn, one receives a natural legal order which, in turn, determines the sources of international law. The theory does contain empirical elements – Verdross claims to deduce this from an empirically given ‘human nature’ – but there is enough deduction here to illustrate how deduction works.
6.2.2.2 The critique of the Pure Theory
Kelsen’s critical stance against natural law has its origins in the perceived ‘impur- ity’ of natural law thinking, based on its transcending the Is–Ought dichotomy.
At some junctures he also attacks the philosophical foundations of Aristotle’s and Thomas’ theories,99 but we will focus on specific issues, foremost on transcending the dichotomy.100
(1) In order for natural law to work properly, at least some norms have to be based on some form of fact. In other words, a natural law theory depends upon transcending the duality of Is and Ought.101 It was shown above that Alfred
96 Manfred Rotter, Die Reine Rechtslehre im Vửlkerrecht – eine eklektizistische Spurensuche in Theorie und Praxis, in: Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner, Klaus Zeleny (eds), Hans Kelsen und das Vửlkerrecht. Ergebnisse eines Internationalen Symposiums in Wien (1.–2. April 2004) (2004) 51–81 at 61.
97 Kelsen (1960) supra note 7 at 223–225 (Ch 34 i).
98 Kelsen (1960) supra note 7 at 227 (Ch 34 j); Rudolf Bindschedler, Zum Problem der Grundnorm, in: Friedrich August von der Heydte et al. (eds), Vửlkerrecht und rechtliches Weltbild. Festschrift für Alfred Verdross (1960) 67–76 at 72.
99 Kelsen (1963) supra note 68 at 875–904.
100 Kelsen (1979) supra note 12 at 52–57 (Ch 17 II–III).
101 Kelsen (1963) supra note 68 at 873–874; Kelsen (1979) supra note 12 at 54–55 (Ch 17 II).
Uncertainty in International Law 216