Normative theory is different from empirical theory in that – for all the distortion that theory in the natural sciences can produce – in empirical science the object of study is a fact, an objectively given ‘reality’ (or at least claims to be). An empirical
94 Kelsen (1928) supra note 68 at 286 (para 4).
95 Alexy (2002) supra note 13 at 191, 193; Behrend (1977) supra note 22 at 62–63; Edel (1998) supra note 21 at 217.
96 In this chapter the dichotomy of Is and Ought and the category of Ought have been treated as identical. People could find fault with what might be considered imprecise terminology. In doing so it has to be emphasised that as normative scientists (legal philosophers) we have to establish the Ought, rather than the Is. Thus the establishment of the dichotomy between the categories makes the Ought possible. The Is is not our concern, and therefore the delimitation between them for the normative scientist is a function of the Ought – hence the identity of the dichotomy and the second category of thought in this chapter.
97 Kelsen (1960) supra note 2 at 206 (Ch 34 d); Kelsen (1979) supra note 2 at 206 (Ch 59 I c).
98 Edel (1998) supra note 21 at 214.
99 ‘deren Geltung selbst innerhalb der Sphọre des positiven Rechtes unbegrỹndet und unbegrỹnd- bar bleibt’; Kelsen (1928) supra note 68 at 286 (para 3).
7.3 The inevitable Grundnorm 259
(social or natural) science has a ‘given’ which is the object of its study. Its theories have to fit and explain that ‘given’. A natural science fails if it cannot adequately explain its object. When it is argued that scholars ‘must do [this or that] if they want to produce satisfactory accounts of law’;100 or when the argument is that the
‘theory . . . that every legal order has a Grundnorm as basis of validity of the constitution is empirically false’,101 empirical and normative sciences are com- mingled. What these attempt to do is impossible with respect to normative theory, because here the theory through the creation of the intellectual superstructure determines its object: the Ought. A purported ‘given’ that does not satisfy the criteria of normative theory is not a ‘given’ of normative scholarship.
When can the ‘satisfactory explanation’ criterion, which seems to be assumed as a necessary condition for any legal theory, be said to be fulfilled? What is this criterion? Is it merely to be able to ‘explain’ the maximum number of norms held to be valid? This question is in itself very problematic, because legal theory is not a quasi-mathematical description of real events (as natural science is). It has the power to create and undo its object: we trade in ideal ideas, not in reality. The second statement given above is equally problematic, because it also presupposes something that theory is supposed to constitute, i.e. when a norm is a norm. That a Grundnorm is necessarily presupposed is neither verifiable nor falsifiable, because it is the Grundnorm – as mental construct – that determines what is a constitution as normative order in the first place.
If one were to argue that the point of testing a positivist legal theory on positive law is not so much one of the theory being able to (or having to) explain all positive law, but that the theory is not contradicted by some positive law, we might respond that any contradictory law can also be called non-law, since the theory of norms not only describes what is (as a scientific theory would), but primarily acts as constituent – it makes law what it is.
A zoologist classifying butterflies does not create them; a legal theorist by proposing a theory can ‘decide’ what is to be a norm.
What is vital at this point is simply that nature is as it is, before and even entirely independently of whether its laws are cognized by science. Not nature, but natural science is a product, something generated by human cognitive activity, whereas the positive law itself is a product, something generated by human activity, and, moreover, something eminently changeable.102
The choice between normative theories becomes thus at the same time trivial and existential. It is trivial, because the choice made cannot be attacked by showing that it is falsified by reality. We simply cannot prove that a theory of norms is
100 Matthew H. Kramer, In defense of legal positivism. Law without trimmings (1999) 164.
101 ‘These . . . daò zu jeder Rechtsordnung eine Grundnorm als Geltungsgrund der Verfassung gehửrt, ist empirisch falsch’; Priester (1984) supra note 6 at 219 (emphasis added).
102 Edel (1998) supra note 21 at 211; Adolf Menzel, Naturrecht und Soziologie, in: Festschrift zum einunddreiòigsten Deutschen Juristentag 3. bis 6. September, Wien 1912 (1912) 1–60 at 59.
Uncertainty in International Law 260
contradicted by reality, because we are concerned with a different realm, which does not depend on reality for its ‘truth’. The choice is existential, because every- one cognising norms has already made the choice, even if they are not aware that they have done it. It is an expression of our existential freedom to choose our own dogmas and is thus most profound. We all have to live with our choice and are damned to it; we are responsible for the choices we make – even and especially for our theories – because with relentless Konsequenz the consequences of our choices will ensue.
7.3 The inevitable Grundnorm 261
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