The strong proponents of the depopulation view are the historians Joseph Inikori and Patrick Manning. Gemery and Hogendorn (1979) also add an alternative dimension to the view, basing their argument on trade theory. Inikori (1992) argues that the slave trade out of Africa during the period 1450 to 1870 resulted in massive depopulation of the continent.
The population throughout this period remained too low to trigger divi- sion of labour, growth in internal trade, specialization and diversifi cation, transformation of the technology and organization of production in the manufacturing sector. As a result, manufacturing in pre- colonial Africa could not develop beyond the handicraft stage. In the agricultural sector, the eff ects were more immediate. The low ratio of population to cultivable land encouraged dispersed settlements throughout the continent, particu- larly in Sub- saharan Africa. The population moved towards an extensive rather than intensive form of agriculture, which made subsistence and local self- suffi ciency predominant. This had a dampening eff ect on tech- nology adoption and production organization in the long run. African agriculture largely remained primitive and undercommercialized during this period.
Fage (1978) and Lovejoy (1982) strongly disagree with Inikori’s view.
They argue that Inikori’s claim of an absolute decline in the African popu- lation due to the slave trade is unfounded. Fage (1978) also adds that the trade had a minimal impact demographically. However, Manning (1981, 1982) and Thornton (1980) show that the demographic eff ects are signifi - cant no matter what the absolute totals are.
Manning (1981, 1982) adds another dimension to the depopulation view.
He shows that the African continent, faced with an increasing demand for slaves from the New World, reacted by increasing the supply of slaves.
This increase in availability of slaves also raised the African demand for slaves. Africans preferred female slaves, whereas young male slaves were exported across the Atlantic to work in the plantations. This engendered huge imbalance in African sex ratios, which had a long- term impact on the continent’s demographic structure. According to his estimates, the continent’s population was held in check during the eighteenth and the nineteenth century by the slave trade, restricting economic progress.
Finally, Gemery and Hogendorn (1979) add that the mass removal of the working- age population from the continent caused an implosion of the African production possibility frontier as the lost labour input aff ected virtually all production choices. This resulted in unambiguous reduction in the welfare of the continent. The secular decline in welfare continued over more than two centuries, plunging the continent into economic backwardness.
The major contributors to the sociopolitical view are Inikori (1977, 1992) Manning (1981, 1982) and Miller (1988).
Inikori (1992) argues that a vast majority of slaves that were exported were free individuals captured by force. The capture took a number of forms, notably kidnapping, raids organized by the state, warfare, pawning, via the judicial procedures, tributes and so forth. Firearms were imported from the Europeans in exchange for slaves, particularly during the period 1750 to 1807, which were used for capturing more slaves (Inikori, 1977).
Rodney (1966) and Meillassoux (1976) show that an increase in the Atlantic slave trade led to more being captured and expansion of the African slave trade, often by violence. Lovejoy (1994) shows that warfare, raiding and kidnapping were the means of enslavement for more than three- quarters of the slaves captured during 1805 to 1850 from central Sudan. The judicial process became a tool for enslaving people within the community (Klein, 2001). Klein (2001) observes that judicial penalties in the form of compensation, exile or beatings were converted to enslave- ment. Inikori (2000) argues that the increase in the trade for captives insti- tutionalized banditry and corruption for more than three hundred years in the continent, which retarded socioeconomic development.
Curtin (1975) partially disapproves of Inikori’s view. He argues that it is improper to view confl icts that arose from political causes in Africa in the same light as those that originated from purely economic motives, such as the slave trade. Inikori (1992), however, questions the usefulness of this dichotomy as these relationships were far more complex. According to his view, ‘attempts to establish any form of simplistic relationship are therefore misleading’ (Inikori, 1992, p. 26).
Manning’s work focuses on Dahomey, which is roughly the area around the Bight of Benin, during the period 1640 to 1860 (Manning, 1981, 1982). He observes that the immense increase in slave prices with a price elasticity of supply of 1.5 created the incentive for capturing more slaves.
Institutions were set up during 1640 to 1670 in this area, which were con- ducive to capturing slaves. The institutions included warfare, raiding, kid- napping, judicial procedures and tributes. Manning (1982) writes, ‘These structures further reinforced a willingness to tolerate or justify the enslave- ment of one’s enemies or even one’s own’ (p. 9). In the case of Dahomey, the state became an active participant in the collection and delivery of slaves, which is evidence favouring Inikori’s argument.
Miller (1988) gives an account of the deadly nature of the process of capture in Angola. He writes that warfare and violence stimulated the capture of slaves in West Central Africa, often capturing slaves in exhausted, shaken or physically wounded condition. Populations were raided consistently by stronger neighbours, and harassed and driven out from their homes and land. Gemery and Hogendorn (1979) add that the culture of raiding and warfare created a distinct minority class in African society who became far more powerful than the rest of the population, both in economic as well as political terms. The slave traders of Africa started enjoying European goods, currency and guns in return for slaves.
They made signifi cant gains from trade, at least in the short run, even though everyone was unambiguously worse off in the long run due to the implosion of the production possibility frontier (Gemery and Hogendorn, 1979). The extreme inequality of wealth distribution tilted the existing institutions in favour of the slave traders, which created the foundation for further inequality in the future. This is consistent with the theory of institutions, inequality and growth proposed by Engerman and Sokoloff (1994) and Acemoglu et al. (2005a) with respect to the New World.
These institutions persisted throughout the pre- colonial period, further intensifying the problem. After colonization, the colonial powers did not interfere with the existing extractive institutions of the natives. They were reinforced by them instead (Robinson, 2002). Persistence of weak institu- tions had a negative impact on the long- run economic development of the continent.
Nunn (2008) also provides a similar account. He shows that the slave trade prevented state development, encouraged ethnic fractionalization and weakened legal institutions. Through these channels, the slave trade continues to aff ect current economic development in Africa. However, Bhattacharyya (2009b) shows that Nunn’s evidence is not robust to the inclusion of malaria and other geographic variables.