In recent years, increasing difficulties in the process of European unification have surfaced, especially after the introduction of the single currency in the late 1990s.
These difficulties reached their apex with the debt crisis in Greece that subsequently spread to other southern European countries and Ireland. In the wake of economic contagion, experts once again started to raise serious doubts about the viability of European unification in its current form. Our objective here is to assess the validity of these doubts by focusing on the forces that led initially to the process of European enlargement and unification, and have maintained its momentum, despite the crises of identity and cohesion that the European Union (EU) has faced from time to time.
7.3.1 Milestones in the Unification Process Up to Date
Economic integration in Europe started with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in April 18, 1951, by the Treaty of Paris. One year earlier (May 9, 1950), a motion had been made to this effect by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman and enthusiastically seconded by Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of West Germany. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands responded positively as well, sensing an opportunity to create an
economic union that would help bolster lasting peace in Western Europe. Trade among these countries grew increasingly liberalised in the years that followed, and gradually as a group they developed a common customs policy towards third countries. Finally, at the end of this early phase in March 1957, the six countries in the ECSC signed the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community (EEC).
In 1960, the United Kingdom (UK), along with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland, established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). EFTA’s objectives relative to those of the EEC were less supportive of a free market economy oriented towards economic growth and apparently indifferent to the vision of economic and political unification of Europe. Partly due to these deficiencies and partly due to the encouraging accomplishments of the EEC, many counties participating in EFTA opted eventually to join the EEC. This trend was confirmed in 1973 with the entrance into the EEC of the UK, Denmark and Ireland.
Subsequently, the EEC expanded to include (a) in 1981, Greece, which had already signed an Association Agreement in 1961; (b) in 1986, Spain and Portugal; (c) in 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden and (d) more recently, several countries from the bloc of the former Soviet Union. As a result, the EEC, which started out with 6-member countries in 1951, grew to 12 in 1986, 15 in 1995, and presently stands at 27.1
European integration was accompanied by two trends, namely, the transfer of powers from the member-states to community institutions, and, secondly, the increasing complexity of the central administration in Brussels, due to the expanding number of member-states and the introduction of new programmes and policies. These trends were expected to hamper coordination because they imposed additional restrictions on the governments of member-states. The difficulties did not take long to surface. As we noted previously, in the late 1970s the ideology supporting a free market economy gained momentum in USA and UK, favouring a transfer of responsibilities from the centre to the periphery. Thatcher’s fiery speeches against the growing bureaucracy in Brussels2 and the continued flow of new costly community programmes increased the resistance of member-states to integration. Newer member-states also resisted adopting common economic policies and continued to fight for the preservation of their highly interventionist policies at home. With these fronts open, the process of integration lost momentum and strong centrifugal forces appeared in the horizon. This explains why, prompted by France and Germany, member-states committed to the provisions of the Single European Market act set forth in the Milan Convention (1985), which called for open borders within Europe starting from January 1, 1993. In the following years,
1Of the 12 countries which were added during the latest enlargement, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia entered in 2004, whereas Bulgaria and Romania entered in 2007.
2For example, according to Aldcroft (2001, 270), the bureaucracy in the EEC in 1982 produced 80 million forms of documents.
despite various hurdles in reducing bureaucracy and establishing a free market economy across member-states, the growth prospects in the EU improved consid- erably and this enabled member-states to proceed in January 1, 1999, to the next phase, namely that of monetary union.
7.3.2 Tactical and Strategic Considerations
Explanations abound as to why Western Europe pursued closer economic coopera- tion after the Second World War. One such explanation draws on the benefits that stemmed from the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1948. These developments, this explanation suggested, helped the leaders of major European countries under- stand that cooperation was possible and beneficial for their countries.3 Another explanation, proposed by Milward (1984, 356–9), is that European countries acceded to closer economic cooperation for two reasons: First, because they faced similar economic problems (low growth, inflation, unemployment), and, secondly, because the experience in Versailles (1919) after the First World War proved that, despite the mutual exchange of reparations, retaining full independence in their economic policies did not maintain peace. Still a third explanation has been put forward by Kaiser (2007, 191–256). According to this, the proliferation of Christian Democracy in the countries which took the lead in the establishment of the EU played a key role, because it served as a foundation for the development of intense bonds and common beliefs about the future of Europe.
We believe that European leaders chose unification for other reasons, altogether.
The victors in the Second World War found themselves in differing economic and political camps. The countries of the Western Alliance, which are organised along the model of democracy with a free market economy, under the leadership of the USA, comprised one group, while the countries of the Eastern Alliance, which up until recently were organised along the model of communism, comprised the other under the leadership of Russia. Western European countries could hope to gain their economic and political independence from the two superpowers only through adopting Montesquieu and Hume’s principle, which stated that trade brings people together, voluntarily rather than through coercion, and leads them to mutual respect and similar manners and customs (see Karayiannis 2004). This approach allowed them adequate leeway to achieve peace, security and rising material standards for
3Berend (2006, 193–194, 199) points out that the initiative in 1948 of certain European countries, e.g. France, Italy and Netherlands, to discuss the possibility of forming a customs union was also promoted by the Marshall Plan. As the data compiled by Eichengreen and Uzan (1992) show, the economic benefits of the Marshall Plan for Western countries were not only investment and imports, but mainly political and monetary stability, as well as liberalisation from the strong interventionist practices during the war years.
their peoples,4who had suffered in the wars, and at the same time pursue the vision of a unified and independent Europe.
Warleigh (2004, 16–9) explains why European countries did not form immedi- ately a federation in the form of a United States of Europe. In his view, they were discouraged by the USA and the Soviet Union, which did not wish to have another contender in world affairs, and by some leading European powers, like France and the UK. Hence, the course that remained open to bring them closer to a lasting peace and security was to integrate their economies by forming a common market in which people and capital would enjoy full mobility on the basis of competition.5 This was the intermediate, i.e. the tactical approach, which fostered by the organisational genius of Jean Monnet took the form of several sequential steps up the ladder of unification. Immediatly below we turn to them, postponing for later the discussion about the forces that determine the strategic aspects of political unification in the context of the multipolar world which is in the making.