New Zealand sent troops to South Vietnam in May 1965 amidst great controversy. This decision sparked off ‘one of the longest foreign policy debate’ in the history of the New Zealand Parliament, giving testament to the importance and divisiveness of this decision129. This chapter will discuss the reasons for and against deployment and argue that the debate did not weaken ANZUS in Southeast Asia as long as the Holyoake government recognised that New Zealand’s national interests were embedded there. New Zealand’s deployment was a turning point in more ways than one. In the article “New Zealand and Southeast Asia”, Keith Jackson, in 1971, asserted that Britain was where New Zealand’s true loyalty laid, but it helped the US because of practical reasons130. It was a turning towards ANZUS interests, and an important precursor to its decision to remain in the Straits without the British. Richard Kennaway argued in New Zealand Foreign Policy 1951-71 that Wellington’s decision to remain in Singapore independent of London was a breakthrough in foreign policy. However, I would argue that while the decision to join ANZUS was the first breakthrough in foreign policy to join an alliance without Britain’s leadership, the Vietnam decision was more significant because New Zealand, for the first time, chose to a deployment that was outside of Britain’s interest and leadership. The dictate of self-interest was beginning to clearly overrule Commonwealth loyalties. This set the stage for New Zealand’s future deployment in 1969 to remain in Singapore. Although some might argue that New Zealand made this decision because of its dependency on ANZUS, I believe that Wellington’s collusion with US-Australia was an unmistakable sign that New Zealand’s association with Asia took precedence over British affairs. This decision had to be considered within the political developments between New Zealand and Britain in the 1960s, when Britain was perceived to be aligning itself with Europe by joining the EEC. New Zealand had to decide whether ANZUS or Britain was more in line with its own stake in Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, it also sowed seeds of doubt in the value of the US alliance within its
129 NZ Hansard (NZH), 10 June 1965 p. 326.
130 Keith Jackson, “New Zealand and Southeast Asia” in Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (JCPS), Vol. IX 1971 Leicester University Press, pp. 7-8.
population. Thus, the Vietnam War issue was a complex double-edged sword that cut both ways for New Zealand.
Debating Deployment
In March 1965, when news of US bombing reached New Zealand, citizens wrote strongly to the Evening Post (EP) against the American use of weapons like napalm and white phosphorous bombs. These emotionally charged letters condemned the use of these weapons and accused the US of escalating the conflict towards a possible world war.131 According to some of these critics in the press, US involvement prevented a non-violent solution to the war. Even before the parliament debates in May-Jun, domestic critics already questioned the government on the wisdom of supporting the “inhuman USA” in the Vietnam conflict and wanted the government to withdraw from Vietnam132.
On 27 May 1965, Holyoake stirred the hornet’s nest when he announced New Zealand would send combat troops to assist in the struggle against “Communist aggression in South Vietnam.133” This decision sparked off a heated controversy for about three weeks in parliament. The debate was important because deployment, which involved a cost, represented true interests. The argument revealed the fundamental issue of where New Zealand’s interest really laid.
One day after Holyoake’s announcement, the Opposition argued vehemently in the House of Representatives that, given the severity of the matter, while the Prime Minister was within his right to deploy troops, he should not have done so without discussion in Parliament. According to Labour, Holyoake’s decision-making without consulting Opposition views proved he did not care about the feelings of the population that the
131 The Evening Post (EP), 31 March 1965.
132 EP , 25 March 1965.
133 NZH, 27 May 1965. See Roberto Rabel, “ The Dovish Hawk: Keith Holyaoke and the Vietnam War” in Ed. Margaret Clark, Sir Keith Holyaoke: Towards a Political Biography (Palmerstone North: The Dunsmore Press Ltd. 1997) for an account of how Holyoake perceived the Vietnam War. This thesis is not merely concerned why NZ entered the war but also its impact on SEA, ANZUS and how it ultimately led to a stronger presence in SEA in 1969.
New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) represented134. The Labour party advocated that aid, instead of military contribution could eradicate poverty, the root of Communism. The idea enjoyed tremendous popular support over military intervention because it gave a progressive and humanitarian feeling to its contribution135. On 28 May 1965, Arnold Nordmeyer, the Labour Leader responded in Parliament on two key issues, Economic/Social Aid over Military and the preference to contribute under UN collective defence rather than SEATO and the US. Regarding the aid, he said,
Communism cannot be defeated by military forces alone…but Communism can be defeated in so far as the fortunate nations of the world - and New Zealand is one of them - are prepared to give… aid to the people of these areas, so that their living standards can be improved and conditions created in which it is impossible for the seeds of Communism to grow…. We support that form of aid rather than the military aid which the government has proposed.136
Furthermore, the NZLP felt that the status of the Vietnam War was unclear: it was not clear whether it was a civil war or invasion. If the indigenous National Liberation Front (NLF) was fighting against a corrupt and undemocratic government, the New Zealand had no business there, even under SEATO137. This issue of ‘invasion’ was crucial because it legitimised New Zealand’s entry into the conflict under SEATO. Thus, those who opposed the war cited the confusion and revulsion towards perceived American terror tactics as the main reason why New Zealand had no place in Vietnam138. However, according to the government White Paper New Zealand Military Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam 1965 (NZMARV) published to explain its decision, Communist deviousness was attributed to be the cause of this confusion. Since this White Paper was published by Holyoake to justify his decision, it could be suspected to carry with it
134 NZH, 28 May 1965 p. 24.
135 Pearson, Mark Paper Tiger: New Zealand’s Part in SEATO 1954-77 (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs 1989) pp. 54-5.
136 NZH, 28 May 1965, p. 14.
137 The NLF was the political organ of the Communist in the South Vietnam.
138 New Zealand Foreign Policy with Special Reference to SEA (NZFPSRSEA): The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs 1968, pp. 21-22.
certain bias139. It revealed that Communists agents, who were born in the South but defected to the North because of ideological reasons, were specially selected by Hanoi to lead the insurgency. This tactic apparently worked because it convinced critics that it was an insurgency rather than an invasion140.
Holyoake replied that while aid should form the mainstay of Wellington’s assistance because it was by nature a peaceful and non-militant country, the situation, invasion rather than civil unrest, made it impractical because security must first be established before re-development could be meaningful. Moreover, the North Vietnamese spurned UN involvement or any negotiations unless its terms were met141. New Zealand fact finders from both sides of the House who visited South Vietnam to understand the situation there before Parliament began reinforced the first point. The mission members were convinced that Communist aggression made the need for establishing security through military means a priority142.
On 28 May 1965, ironically, Opposition member James Faulkner agreed with the government and affirmed in Parliament that, “Sometimes guns must be used to build a law and order structure.143” Then on 3 June 1965, Another Opposition member, Basil Arthur, said in Parliament that:
There is no doubt in my mind that the situation in Vietnam has been brought about by blatant aggression by the forces of North Vietnam (NVA) in breach of the 1954 Geneva accord…. North Vietnam by initiating and encouraging guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam and later by arming the Vietcong is to blame for the present state of hostilities there….
In my opinion the US is legally honouring its commitments in South
139 However, its findings corresponded with sources, governmental, opposition, and foreign, thus reinforcing its reliability. For example, see M. Ghazali Shafie Malaysia: International Relations: Selected Speeches by Mohammad Ghazali Shafie (Kuala Lumpur: Creative Enterprise 1982) pp. 101-2. Ghazali declared that the Vietnam War was illegal because the Vietcong were not nationalist but “Communist Squatters” that had no legitimate business in the south. By calling them “Communist Squatters”, the Malaysian official indicated that they were not legally entitled to any political support from other governments.
140 NZMARV 1965 p. 46.
141 The terms were for all US/foreign forces to leave South Vietnam before any negotiations were to take place. This was unacceptable to the US and western allies who did not trust the North.
142 The Argus Leader (AL), 18 July 1965.
143 NZH, 28 May 1965, p. 33.
Vietnam by helping the country resist aggression.…We should also substantially increase our constructive aid to this country. It must be borne in mind that there cannot be development without security.144
Merely tackling poverty alone could not solve the problem because the Vietcong were already amidst the people and without security, the Communists could undo the good that civilian aid did145. North Vietnam not only armed and encouraged the Vietcong, they also infiltrated regular troops into the South at the rate of approximately 7000 a month146. Mission members also believed that the ‘civil war’ argument emerged because New Zealand reporters covering the war could not differentiate between the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese147. Government defence of its decision was robust because from the offset, Holyoake asserted that New Zealand’s best defence against a belligerent and hungry China was SEATO and ANZUS, both anchored by the US148.
Still, Labour believed that war was futile and should be resolved diplomatically.
However, this presupposed that Hanoi was opened to negotiations149. But early as 1964, communications already broke down between Washington and Hanoi. On 27 May 1964, LBJ told a senator on the phone:
Well, we are ready to confer with anybody, anytime, but, that conferences ain’t going to do a damn bit of good. They ain’t going to take back and behave. We tell them every week, we tell Khrushchev, send China, Hanoi, and all of them word that we would get out of there and stay out if they quit raiding their neighbours, and they just say, screw you.150
Elaborating on this point in the NZMARV, the North Vietnamese, in 1965, insisted that
“all internal affairs must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in
144 NZH, 3 June 1965 pp. 159-61.
145 NZMARV 1965 p. 34.
146 Ibid.
147 AL, 18 July 1965.
148 NZ’s official Vietnam War historian Roberto Rabel believed that NZ’s position on the war was the result of Holyoake’s perception of how NZ fitted into the context of a broiling SEA of the 1960s. See Rabel, “ The Dovish Hawk” p. 178.
149 This was near impossible because of the extreme difference in opinions between Johnson and Ho Chi Minh. See EAR 1967 2 February 1967.
150 FRUS-XVII “Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell”
Washington, May 27 1964.
accordance with the program of the NLF, without any foreign intervention”.151 A peace settlement established purely on Communist terms was unacceptable. It was also a violation of SEATO’s constitution that its members help one another in times of aggression.152 William Bundy also believed that “Hanoi had laid too much in the war to quit without total control.153”
Another argument put forth on 28 May was the need for collective defence under the UN instead of a adopting a pro-US policy of involvement. Aware of New Zealand’s insecurity and limited ability for self-defence, the Opposition believed that the country’s security should be found under UN auspices 154. Labour also stressed the need to resolve the conflict through the UN. However, it was an impractical choice of resolution simply because North Vietnam rejected it. With Russia and China in the UN Security Council, hidden agendas and conflicting national interests would frustrate an impartial ruling on the Vietnam War155. LBJ himself was frustrated because the US, in 1964, could not get a majority vote in the Security Council in its favour156. Well-intentioned as it may be, Labour’s proposition to pin hopes on the UN seemed nạve and revealed an ignorance of the true nature and complexities of the problems presented by the Vietnam War. Mark Pearson commented in 1989 that NZLP’s ideas were “outdated” and “political debate itself was not well-informed” in Paper Tiger: New Zealand’s Part in SEATO 1954-77.157 The question of an independent New Zealand foreign policy, raised by the NZLP on 9 Jun 1965 was a two-fold, bitter fight as the Opposition questioned the government’s autonomy from US influence, whereas the Prime Minister charged that Labour was going back on its word to honour New Zealand’s alliance obligations158. The challenge laid in 2 problems, firstly Labour deemed Confrontation as New Zealand’s main concern and
151 NZMARV 1965 pp. 58-9.
152 EAR Vol. 15 “Statement by the PM Labour Policy on Vietnam” 20 Dec 1965. Holyoake told Labour in December 1965, “We seek nothing more than a just, negotiated settlement…. But Communist North Vietnam does not.”
153 Oral Histories of the Johnson Administration 1963-9 Fiche no. 92
154 NZH, 28 May 1965, p. 31.
155 NZH, 10 June 1965, pp. 328-9.
156 FRUS-XVII “Telephone Conversation” Washington, May 27 1964.
157 Pearson, Paper Tiger p.99.
158 NZH 9 June 1965, p. 315.
secondly, the belief that the Vietnam insurance was superfluous because the US would defend New Zealand anyway159.
Regarding Malaysia, the Opposition said earlier in May 1965, “Our main concern is that we cannot undertake full obligations to Malaysia if we enter into commitments in South Vietnam. Because geographically Malaysia is far closer to us and to Australia than is South Vietnam.”160
This concern seemed valid as the AL criticised Holyoakes’s overseas defence commitments in July 1965: it stretched New Zealand resources too thinly to defend its home territory161. However, Holyoake’s reply revealed very tellingly where his government had pitched New Zealand’s defence. The AL reported on 19 July 1965 that,
“Holyoake told the conference that government defence policy was realistic and would enable the government to plan an effective role in the defence of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia.162”
By July 1965, clearly, to Holyoake, the defence of New Zealand’s interest was synonymous with the American and British-led defence of Southeast Asia. Note that there was no mention of defending New Zealand home territory, although the critique addressed his concern there. Although New Zealand’s contribution to Malaysia might tie Britain to Southeast Asia, its support for the US hinted of insecurity towards London because in 1950, the British government acknowledged that in the event of war, Britain could no longer defend New Zealand 163. New Zealand’s decision to join a non-British effort based on its own assessment of interests signalled a major shift in foreign policy calculation164. The splitting of New Zealand forces between Malaysia and Vietnam also
159 NZFPSRSEA p. 16.
160 NZH 28 May 1965, p. 13.
161AL, July 19 1965.
162 Ibid. Although this incident took place in 1965, Holyoake’s point was formally incorporated as defence policy. See RDP 1966 pp. 5-6.
163 McKinnon, Malcolm Independence and Foreign Policy: NZ in the World since 1935 Auckland:
Auckland University Press 1993 p. 122.
164 NZFPSRSEA p.3. Evidence up to 1965 hinted that the NZ government was not likely to not send troops to Vietnam. See Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno pp. 112-4.
revealed that Wellington recognised that the onus to defeat Communism in Southeast Asia did not fall onto New Zealand but to the US and Britain. Their numbers were insignificant compared to their partners: about 1700 in Malaysia and approximately 200 in Vietnam in 1965.
All foreign policy decisions are hazardous gambles165. No one could predict the future outcome of the Vietnam War, but New Zealand leadership, fearing Communism and given its constraints, saw no alternatives. It responded as best and as quickly as it could.
Holyoake concluded the debate in Parliament on 9 Jun 1965. He said:
The point is, what better policy can we follow? This government after anxious and very careful consideration came to the conclusion that the American government was right… and deserved active support from the New Zealand government. In reaching that conclusion, it was not necessary to believe that the Americans are always right or entirely right…. The most we can say is that, after very carefully weighing all the considerations, we came firmly to the view that this was the right and proper course to follow.166
Despite the unresolved disagreements, both parties agreed that the troops needed the full support of the nation. At the same time, the NZLP absolved itself from the responsibility of deployment. On 10 June 1965, it said, “The Opposition is disturbed that the decision has been made, but nothing will be done by members on this side to prevent anything being made available to those troops while overseas. The decision is the government’s and the government’s alone.167” Although Holyoake ended the 1965 June parliament debate, the controversy continued beyond 1965 as the issue of New Zealand’s future alignment surfaced.
165 Kaplan, Robert D Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos? New York: Random House 2002 p. 38.
166 NZH 9 June 1965 p. 299.
167 NZH, 10 June 1965, p. 323.
Beyond Vietnam: An Independent Foreign Policy
Another major point brought up by the Opposition that transcended the 1965 parliament was whether ANZUS would drag New Zealand into foreign conflicts that involved no immediate national interest168. This could harm New Zealand’s sense of autonomy and invite retaliation. They even argued it was good that someone resisted Communism, as long as it was not New Zealand. In April 1967, Laking answered critics in a landmark speech on New Zealand foreign policy: Wellington’s international relations must be realistic due to its limitations in Asia. Thus, New Zealand needed to make ANZUS viable. Taking into account all perspectives of the debate, he concluded that, “A foreign policy must not only be enlightened and skilful-it must be hard-headed and practical.
Good intentions are no substitute for good sense.169” He reminded his audience, But it is as well to remember that New Zealand is of little strategic importance to anyone…. in a period dominated by great power rivalries, we are one of the few countries which could be regarded as expendable. If we do not… make our contribution to wider international stability, no one is going to give much thought to helping us preserve our continuing independence.170
However, Laking conceded that this led to dependency, as New Zealand was only effective within an alliance and not as an independent military force. In 1969, demonstrating consistency, Holyoake reinforced Laking’s earlier views. He said:
I must say I find it odd that some people, in one breath, can dismiss the ANZUS or Manila treaty as useless because it doesn’t really commit the US to help us and objectionable because it commits us inescapably. If there is “aggression”... we maintain our judgment and voice on what the measures should be in the actual circumstances…. A good ally is not subservient; he has judgment and a voice, and uses them; but he is prepared to take up his share of the burden.171
168 Hoadley, The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook (NZFPH) p. 98.
169 EAR “Problems of New Zealand’s Foreign Policy” 5 April 1967.
170 EAR “Problems of New Zealand’s Foreign Policy” 5 Apri1967.
171, EAR Vol. 19. March 1969. Speech by the PM to the Institute of International Affairs “A Defence and Foreign Policy for New Zealand”. See also Laking’s views in Laking, G.R “Stranger in the House: A View of K. J. Holyoake” pp. 150-1 in Sir Keith Holyaoke..