In 1881, Malays dominated three occupational sectors, forming 53.0% of the labour force in rural production, 62.7% in the maritime industry and 33.1% in government service (Tham 1983: 33). Their forte in rural production and maritime jobs was partially due to their cultural knowledge of Singapore‘s natural resources or nautical skills (Ibid: 34), and partly a consequence of poor education. Their concentration in government service can be attributed to the colonial bureaucrats‘
maintenance of a faỗade of Malay political participation (Ibid: 55).
In 1921, two trends were symptomatic of Malay occupational immobility.
First, Malays stagnated in jobs which did not require much qualifications or management expertise, such as drivers or office-boys (Ibid: 48). Second, the Malay niche in rural production was eroded by mass-produced durables, an outcome of the alliance between Western capital and technological progress (Ibid:
40). In 1874, Malay merchants had insufficient resources to purchase ―square- rigged vessels‖ that were popular amongst Chinese and Western traders (Wong 1978: 60). By the 1900s, Western steamships outmoded Malay and Chinese vessels alike (Ibid: 68).
The above structural changes dampened Malay incomes. To cope with rising land prices, Malays shifted to poorer urban areas (Roff 1967: 35). In 1901, only 13.6% of Singapore‘s urban residents ware Malays (Huff 1994: 58). In 1911, this figure declined to 10.8% before falling to 7.9% by 1921 (Ibid: 58).
Incidentally, the dismal residential arrangements coincided with Malay
concentration in low-paying jobs and the irrelevance of Malay rural produce during the period of industrialization.
By 1957, Malay occupational and residential patterns improved modestly.
Their representation in the armed and police forces had risen to 82.1% and 71.3%
respectively (Table 1). Cultural continuity persisted in maritime occupations;
Malays formed 30.7% of fishermen and 23.4% of deck-crews. They also dominated government-service jobs as office boys (55.3%) and gardeners (62.2%). The proportion of Malays living in urban areas had returned to 1911 figures — 11.0% (Table 2), mirroring their occupational (re)stabilization. In contrast, rural areas such as Katong (27.5%) and the Southern Islands (69.1%) were highly populated by Malays (Table 2). Whilst Katong denoted the eastern districts that Malays occupied historically, Southern Islanders primarily engaged in fishing and poultry rearing (1957 Census of Population (COP) 1964: 93), jobs that were culturally dominated by Malays. Hence, rural housing patterns had strong continuities with the ‗racial‘ blueprint of Raffles‘ Town Plan and Malay occupations.
Table 1: Selected Occupations Showing Relative Malay Dominance, 1957
Source: Derived from 1957 COP (1964: 87).
Occupations Number of Employees % of Malays Total Malay
Armed Forces 8154 6693 82.1
Policemen 4834 3446 71.3
Gardeners 5123 3189 62.2
Office Boys 5439 3039 55.3
Fishermen 4494 1378 30.7
Deck Crews 8922 2089 23.4
Table 2: Distribution of Malays Living in Urban and Rural Districts, 1957
Total City District
Rural Districts Jurong Bukit
Panjang
Serang- goon
Katong Southern Islands*
13.6 11.0 14.2 12.9 8.1 27.5 69.1
* Southern Islands referred to Pulau Blakang Mati (renamed Sentosa today) and St. John‘s Island.
Source: 1957 COP (1964: 92).
To extrapolate, the cumulative effects of poor educational opportunities, occupational immobility and low incomes when Singapore started to industrialize, depressed Malay mobility. Malays adapted to these structural changes by (re)gaining stable employment in 1957. Their predominance in the armed forces in this period is especially noteworthy. Although the wages were paltry, their strong social support networks embedded in ‗Malay‘ residential areas — and affirmed through anecdotal Malay maxims such as gotong-royong17 (Parkinson 1967: 34–35; Wilder 1968: 158) — had a compensatory effect, albeit to a limited degree.
3.4 INDUSTRIALIZING SINGAPORE,1965–1997
Singapore‘s expulsion from Malaysia on 9th August 1965 marked a critical shift in her political economy. After two decades of decolonization, the People‘s Action Party (PAP) led by English-educated Baba professionals18, assumed political control of Singapore (Turnbull 1989: 288; Tremewan 1994: 101). Ousted from its Malayan hinterland, Singapore abandoned the earlier emphasis on
17 It refers to the practice and ideology of working together as a community to overcome adversity.
18 The first generation of successful leaders comprised of Lee Kuan Yew (lawyer), Toh Chin Chye (physiologist) and Goh Keng Swee (economist).
import-substitution for export-oriented industrialization, in partnership with international capital and multinational corporations (Grice and Dradakis-Smith 1985: 348; Chng et al. 1988; Rodan 1989). Mass education was extended, with particular emphasis on English and technical expertise (Gopinathan 1974: 43).
3.4.1 ‘Local’ and ‘Global’ Structural Changes – Entrenchment of Malay Relative Poverty
Malay educational and income standings deteriorated between 1966 and 1972, due to the snowballing effects of three ‗local‘ structural factors. First, the community‘s intelligentsia class drained when a substantial number of educated Malays moved to Malaysia (Lily 1998: 253). Second, the retreat of British troops in 1971 during decolonization caused structural unemployment19 (Chang 1968:
765), overwhelmingly amongst Malays, as they used to be present in large numbers within the armed forces (K.J. Lee 2006: 187). Third, state resettlement practices between the 1970s and early 1980s that aimed to eradicate urban slums (Grice and Dradakis 1985: 350) uprooted Malay employment patterns and social networks, thereby ingraining Malay relative poverty.
The inaccessibility of the flats from the sea disrupted Malay occupations and incomes, especially for full-time fishermen or wage-earners who wanted to reduce food expenditure through fishing (Chew 1982: 51). The dispersion to different neighbourhoods also upset Malay support networks (Ibid: 53). Although
19 20% of Singapore‘s gross national income and 25000 jobs were directly lost (Turnbull 1989: 294).
housing was provided for, new employment opportunities were not guaranteed (Ibid: 52). Furthermore, disposable household incomes shrank as living costs soared during early independence (Hassan 1977: 47). This coincided with the sharp increase in income inequality after 1980 (Islam and Kirkpatrick 1986: 33).
In tandem with Singapore‘s ‗global‘ move to an export-oriented industrialization, the manufacturing sector thrived between 1960 and 1982 (Rigg 1988: 340). This corresponded with the widespread proletarianization of Malays.
In 1980, Malays had the highest proportion of workers in manufacturing (36.4%) compared to Chinese (29.1%) and Indians (26.7%) (1980 COP [Economic Characteristics] 1981: 55). Similarly, Malay women workers trebled from 14.3%
of the total Malay female population in 1970 to 38.3% in 1980, registering the largest increase (Ibid: 3–4). Although incomes as production workers were modest, the household expenses in working poor Malay families were alleviated to some degree.
In 1985, Singapore suffered its ‗first‘ global recession20 since independence. The economic downturn aggravated due to Singapore‘s lagging productivity, costly wage rates and high dependence on American demand (16/9/1985 BW; 23/9/1985 NYT; 26/9/1985 NYT; 6/11/1985a FT; Rigg 1988:
345). In particular, the manufacturing sector contracted by 6.9% and 3.4% in 1985 and 1986 respectively (Rodan 2006: 146). Unemployment peaked at 6.5% in 1986
20 The electronics industry in Singapore was most affected by the economic slump in United States, her biggest trading partner. Although other newly-industrializing countries were also affected, the impact on Singapore was most severe because of her greater reliance on international trade (Rigg 1988: 346).
(Ibid: 147)21, as numerous factories slowed production or shifted elsewhere (6/11/1985b FT). Given their overrepresentation in blue-collar manufacturing jobs, Malays were especially affected.
Table 3: Employed Malays and Chinese by Mean Monthly Income, 1966, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1990, 1995
Year 1966 1973 1974 1979 1980 1990 1995 Malay to Chinese
Income 83.9 68.8 65.4 70.4 65.2 70.1 63.3
Malay Average
Growth for Period - 2.2 8.3 7.7 13.5 10.5 8.3
Chinese Average
Growth for Period - 5.2 13.9 6.1 22.4 9.7 10.5
Source: (K.J. Lee 2006: 177).
The negative repercussions of these ‗local‘ and ‗global‘ structural changes reflected in Malay income trends. The average Malay income was 83.9% of Chinese income in 1996, a year after independence (Table 3). Back then, Malays still possessed geographically-embedded support networks, as affirmed by a state report on identified ‗Malay‘ settlement areas in 1967 (Yeh et al. 1970). By 1973, the Malay to Chinese income ratio fell drastically to 68.8% before sliding to 65.4% in 1974. Between 1974 and 1995, the income inequality between Chinese and Malays was increasing steadily, especially at the higher end of the income scale (K.J Lee 2006: 179). This paralleled Malay concentration in lower-paying jobs, and their failure to make inroads into higher-paying occupations.
21 This figure is still low compared to most countries.